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FOREWORD
 
The Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) has come to
 
play an increasingly important role in the planning and control of
 
the defense and aerospace effort. However, no tool can be used
 
indiscriminately. It is important to know when, how, and under what
 
circumstances PERT can be employed effectively in the procurement
 
process.
 
In PERT and Procurement Policy, Jack Hayya presents a set of
 
optimal rules that enable government procurement officers and the
 
aerospace industry's contracting personnel to make decisions about
 
the appropriate use of PERT, Though the audience of the study is
 
to be found primarily among those engaged in defense and aerospace
 
procurement, all managers who are currently using or planning to use
 
PERT will find the research findings useful.
 
The reader who is interested only in an overview of the study
 
will find a succinct resume in chapters I and VI.
 
PERT and Procurement Policy is a part of a continuing series of
 
studies on the management of research and development programs con­
ducted in the Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
 
Administration, University of California, Los Angeles. The study was
 
largely supported by National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
(NASA) funds.
 
George A. Steiner
 
Director, Division-of Research
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PREFACE
 
,This study is designed to establish a basis for a rational solution
 
of the major problems associated with the use of Program Evaluation
 
and Review Technique (PERT) in the procurement of aerospace and
 
defense weapon systems2 The need for such a study became apparent
 
when discussions with aerospace industry personnel indicated a growing
 
dissatisfaction with the emphasis the government was putting on PERT
 
as the major planning and control technique in the procurement process.
 
IThe research investigation involved a thorough review of the 
literature, interviews with industry and government representatives, 
and a comprehensive questionnaire survey. This paper summarizes the 
findings of these investigations with emphasis on the results of the 
questionnaire survey. I A more detailed discussion of the literature, 
the interviews, and the survey methodology and results is found in 
1
 
the author's doctoral dissertation.
 
The quantitative analysis presented in this report is based on
 
twenty-seven projects reported for PERT/Time and thirty-four for
 
PERT/Cost. Because much of these data were in the category of privi­
leged information, it was necessary to provide anonymity for most of
 
the projects reported and many of the people who participated. The
 
topic itself made necessary the use of specialized aerospace terms.
 
For the convenience of the reader, a glossary of these terms is
 
provided in Appendix I.
 
Jack C. Hayya, A Studv on the Appropriate Use of PERT in
 
Procurement Contracts (Ph.D dissertation, the University of California,

. 

Los Angeles, 1966).
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
This paper is an extension of previous and complementary studies
 
on planning and control network models in general and on Program
 
Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) in particular. Earlier
 
studies include one by Henry B. Eyring on network planning models1
 
and another by Peter P. Schoderbek on PERT.2 Eyring and Schoderbek
 
both treat the network model largely as a requirement endogenous to
 
the firm. They do not analyze its impact on the firm when the use
 
of the model itself is dictated by exogenous circumstances--that is,
 
when the government requires the use of a network planning and con­
trol model such as PERT.
3
 
Since this NASA Research Paper deals with the latter, it in this
 
respect differs from other studies on network planning models or PERT.
 
Furthermore, it is oriented to the functions of government procure
 
ment or systems project officers in that it presents optimal decision
 
rules for the use of PERT in procurement contracts.
 
The government's need of PERT for planning and controlling com­
plex weapons' systems may be traced to the failure of less sophisti­
cated techniques (such as Gantt charts) in harnessing cost-overruns
 
iHenry B. Eyring, Evaluation of Planning Models for Research and
 
Development Projects (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University,
 
1963).
 
2peter P. Schoderbek, PERT - An Evaluation and Investigation of
 
its Applications and Extensions (Ph. D. dissertation, The University
 
of Michigan, 1964).
 
3Schoderbek, however, considers a requirement by the government
 
that a firm use PERT to plan and control a project only one of the
 
reasons for the firm's resistance to PERT.
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and schedule slippages. The reliance on PERT instead of previous
 
methods, however, infringes in some cases upon the proprietary and
 
managerial rights of aerospace firms as, for example, when govern­
ment procurement and systems project officers monitor defense and
 
aerospace contracts in too great detail.
 
It is clear that there are situations when the government is
 
justified in requiring an aerospace firm to use PERT, or any other
 
technique, in a particular contract. There are other times, however,
 
when an aerospace firm, as a unit in a competitive and free society,
 
is best fitted to exercise judgment and discretion regarding policies
 
of management. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3200.9, other
 
government memoranda, and even the current PERT literature do not
 
clearly draw the line between the reasonable domain of government
 
intervention in the management of aerospace firms and the justified
 
proprietary domain of the firms themselves. To be sure, the boundary
 
line between the domain of public interest and the domain of private
 
concern is sometimes non-existent in the defense and aerospace effort.
 
Into this no-mans land, characteristic of the government - aerospace
 
industry relationship, fall many of the problems associated with
 
the use of PERT in procurement contracts. Much of the friction
 
between the government and the aerospace industry attributed to PERT
 
is really due to the older, more subtle and extremely more complex
 
"marriage" between the defense establishment and the aerospace industry
 
DOD Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense Robert S.
 
MeNamara, February 26, 1964, and July 1, 1965.
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Objectives of the Study
 
It is possible to look at the use of PERT in the procurement
 
process by itself, apart from the more general question of what con­
stitutes a reasonable relationship between the government and the
 
aerospace industry. Thus some basic decision rules, or principles,
 
may be derived to aid government procurement officers in determining
 
when, where, and under what circumstances to require an aerospace con­
tractor to use PERT. The objective of this study is to develop a set
 
of such principles, although they are subject, of course, to the needs
 
of the government, the rights of the contractor, and the logic of the
 
situation.
 
When this study was launched in the fall of 1963, it was apparent
 
that four areas of controversy relating to the use of PERT in procure­
ment contracts existed between the government and the aerospace industry.
 
The first of these concerned the type of contract. For example, should
 
a procurement officer require a contractor to use PERT in cost-plus­
fixed-fee contracts as well as in firm fixed-price contracts? Con­
tractor and government responsibility differs sharply in these two
 
contracts according to the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation.5
 
Obviously, the type of contract should influence the government's
 
requirements for managing a project in a specified manner.
 
The second area of controversy was related to the type of project
 
where PERT should be used. At the beginning of the study, some pro­
curement officers were not aware that PERT was designed primarily
 
5Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Department of Defense
 
(Washington, D. C.: July 1964), pp. 327-340.
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for research and development projects. In the rush of enthusiasm
 
for PERT, many people advocated it as an overall tool of planning
 
and control in any type of procurement, whether basic research,
 
research and development (R&D), or production. It was necessary,
 
therefore, to seek a definitive answer to this question even though
 
it seemed to the author from the start that PERT should be used in
 
R&D projects only.
 
The third controversial point involved the threshold contract
 
prices that make mandatory the application of PERT in procurement con­
tracts. When this study (which antedated DOD Directive 3200.9, dated
 
February 26, 1964) was initiated, this was a problem of grave concern
 
for both the aerospace industry and for procurement officers. Even
 
after DOD Directive 3200.9 was issued with threshold contract prices,
 
making the use of PERT/Cost mandatory on projects in engineering
 
development or operational systems developments that exceeded $25
 
million in RDT&E or $100 million in production investment, there was
 
a question as to the arbitrary nature of the choices made by DOD.
 
It was interesting to note that the quantitative analysis made in the
 
course of this study showed that the DOD threshold price criteria were
 
not unreasonable.
 
The fourth, or final, subject of controversy was the level of
 
PERT/Cost detail that should be required by a procurement officer if
 
and when PERT/Cost was a contractual requirement, This was an
 
extremely complex issue because only by looking at detailed data
 
could the governmnt effectively prevent cost-overruns and schedule
 
slippages, Yet, it was at this point that the aerospace industry was
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most vulnerable, and it was sensitive to what it considered an
 
abrogation of its managerial rights and abuse by procurement officers
 
of the governmentt s enormous market powers.
 
Methods of Research
 
An attempt to formulate criteria or principles to resolve the
 
above problems required three steps. First, a thorough review was
 
made of the relevant literature, It was clear from this that a con­
troversy about the value of PERT as a planning and control technique
 
for the firm raged some time before the government took an active
 
interest in PERT. Furthermore, the literature indicated that the
 
government made a number of arbitrary decisions concerning criteria
 
for the use of PERT when it became interested in its use as a planning
 
and control tool in procurement contracts. There was also evidence
 
that some form of dialogue about the subject was taking place between
 
the government and the aerospace industry but the position of the
 
aerospace industry was not being represented accurately.
 
The second step in the research investigation consisted of a
 
series of interviews with representatives of the aerospace industry
 
and the government. The aerospace industry group consisted of top
 
The govern­managers, directors of PERT, and members of PERT staffs. 

ment group consisted of procurement and systems project officers. The
 
purpose of the interviews was to clarify the industry-government
 
situation relating to PERT, gather other information useful to the
 
study, and aid in developing a questionnaire to deal directly with
 
the major areas of controversy.
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The interviews revealed that the industry-government environ­
ment in relationship to PERT was clouded with suspicion, but they
 
also made clear that the suspicion antedated PERT and, indeed, was
 
characteristic of the relationship between the government and the
 
aerospace industry. In addition, the interviews showed that problems
 
arose even if the firm utilized PERT on its own volition and the
 
situation was not complicated by the government's requiring its use
 
in a specific contract.
 
One of these problems was that accounting departments in firms
 
organized functionally were not geared for the cost estimating
 
requirements of the PERT/Cost system. Another was the resistance
 
of the operating personnel and top managers to change symbolized by
 
the furor created in the introduction of PERT into a firm. This
 
resistance, however, was directed more at PERT/Cost than at PERT/Time,
 
because PERT/Time generally proved its worth in solving scheduling
 
problems while creating a minimum of operating difficulties for the
 
firm. PERT/Cost, on the other hand, required extreme changes in
 
organizational procedures (for example, in accounting) and was there­
fore resisted by those who were accustomed to the former practices.
 
The third stage of the research consisted of a comprehensive
 
questionnaire survey of aerospace firms and systems project officers.
 
(The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix II.) The survey con­
centrated on those firms and project offices that the interviews had
 
indicated were using PERT, and it had three purposes. The first was
 
to poll the opinions of those working, or contemplating work with
 
PERT, on the applicability of PERT when it is a government contractual
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requirement as a function of contract type, project type, and threshold
 
contract prices. Opinions were also sought as to what constituted
 
a reasonable level of detail when PERT/Cost was used.
 
The second purpose of the questionnaire was to collect quantitative
 
data so that expressions for the cost of PERT (PERT/Time and PERT/Cost)
 
and for the size of the PERT/Cost work package might be developed.
 
Evidently, criteria for the use of PERT as a function of contract price
 
might depend on the cost of PERT itself. The size of the work package,
 
on the other hand, might be constrained by some quantitative considera­
tions that could be measured in the study.
 
The third purpose of the questionnaire survey was to validate
 
the attitudes of the aerospace industry toward PERT. These attitudes,
 
as expressed in the interviews, were marked by a good deal of skepticism
 
about the value of PERT to the aerospace firm.
 
As a whole, the firms to which questionnaires were sent received
 
90 percent of all contract dollars in 1963. They included, according
 
to the information collected during the interviews, all firms using
 
PERT at the time. They also included the top twenty-one defense and
 
space contractbrs of 1963, of which nineteen replied to the question­
naire. In all, respondent firms accounted for 80 percent of the de­
fense and aerospace business in 1963.
 
Government systems project officers participated in the question­
naire survey as indicated earlier. Their responses and those of the
 
aerospace industry personnel were represented in ninety-seven ques­
tionnaires returned by the participants.
 
-8-

Organization of the Research Paper
 
This chapter has introduced some of the problems associated with
 
the use of PERT in defense and aerospace procurement contracts. The
 
objectives of this paper and the methods of research used have also
 
been discussed.
 
Chapters II, III and IV compose the body of this paper and deal
 
exclusively with the major findings of the research. Chapter II
 
considers the appropriate type of procurement contract for the use of
 
PERT, while Chapter III deals with the type of project or activity
 
suitable to its effective employment. Chapter IV concerns the threshold
 
contract prices that make the use of PERT/Time or PERT/Cost mandatory,
 
and Chapter V deals with the difficult question of what constitutes
 
an appropriate level of detail when PERT/Cost is used in a particular
 
program.
 
Thus Chapters II through V enumerate the findings of the research
 
as they relate to the four major objectives of the study; they rely
 
heavily on the questionnaire survey discussed under Methods of Research.
 
Chapter VI concludes this Research Paper and presents a set of
 
recommendations. These recommendations are conceptualized in a simple
 
decision model for the use of PERT in procurement contracts.
 
CHAPTER II
 
PERT AND TYPE OF CONTRACT
 
There are two major types of procurement contracts--cost­
reimbursement and fixed-price--according to the Armed Services Pro­
1
 
curement Regulation (ASPR). Each type is comprised of several
 
contract categories, which are described in detail in the ASPR.
 
There is one essential difference-between cost-reimbursement and
 
fixed-price contracts. The ASPR states that cost-reimbursement con­
tracts are to be used only when the uncertainties of the program are
 
too great to estimate costs accurately. In cost-reimbursement contracts,
 
the government is responsible for cost overruns, which is generally not
 
true in fixed-price contracts. The problems of low estimates and poor
 
visibility encountered by systems project officers do not usually arise
 
with fixed-price contracts, but if they do, they are the responsibility
 
of the contractor, not of the government.
 
It is surprising, therefore, that DOD Directive 3200.92 does not
 
clearly differentiate contract type as far as the use of PERT is
 
concerned. There has, however, been confusion in government circles
 
on this subject. The USAF PERT Implementation Manual, published
 
August 1, 1963, maintains that the government need for PERT exists for
 
all contracts.3 Figure II-1 graphically portrays how this need
 
iThe Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Department of Defense
 
(Washington, D. C.: July 1964), pp. 327-340.
 
2DOD Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,
 
February 26, 1964, and July 1, 1965.
 
3Air Force Systems Command, USAF PERT Implementation Manual,
 
August 1, 1963, p. 75.
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diminishes as the contract changes from cost-reimbursement to fixed­
price. The kind of risk associated with the different types of con­
tracts-no doubt underlies the pyramid of figure II-l. This is as far
 
as the government literature goes in recognizing that a distinction
 
between contract types must be made.
 
However, even this recognition is completely lacking in some of
 
the literature. For example, in a PERT/Cost conference between the
 
aerospace industry and the government, Mr. George E. Fouch, Deputy
 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, stated
 
in answer to a specific question posed by Mr. Art Simonian of Pratt
 
& Whitney Aircraft:
 
"If I were a contractor and bid on a fixed­
price contract, I wouldn't want to go to work
 
in the morning unless I had done a real good
 
PERT/Cost job in the beginning and throughout
 
this particular contract. Now there are people
 
who, under fixed-price contracts, have volunteered
 
to give this information. I do not know
 
whether legally or ethically the cost pro­
visions of PERT/Cost would be a requirement on
 
a fixed-price contract. On the other hand,
 
I say I wouldn't get caught as a contractor
 
in a fixed-price contract if I did not have a
 
real good PERT/Cost operation. How did I arrive
 
at the bid in the first place"tA
 
Statements such as this caused a good deal of alarm within the
 
aerospace industry. The apprehension concerning the prospect of having
 
to use PERT in fixed-price contracts was evident during the interviews
 
conducted by this author. Responses to the questionnaire also revealed
 
that the concern was genuine and that the aerospace industry objected
 
%OD PERT Coordinating Group, Government-Industry PERT/Cost
 
Conference Proceedings, Rock Island, Illinois, October 1 and 2, 1963
 
(unpaginated).
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strongly to a governmental PERT requirement in fixed-price contracts.
 
Analysis of the Questionnaire Responses
 
The responses of the groups surveyed indicated that distinctions
 
must be made between types of contracts when deciding whether to use
 
PERT. That is, the greater the uncertainty and complexity of a parti­
cular contract, the more advisable the use of PERT.
 
Table II-1 summarizes, by group and category, the responses to
 
question 7, part A of the questionnaire: "In your judgment, what
 
should the criteria be for using PERT on one type of contract versus
 
another?" The table shows that schedule uncertainty is the main
 
criterion for both the government group and the directors of PERT
 
programs. This means that the main concern of both groups is the
 
completion of programs on time. Top managers and members of the PERT
 
staff also place schedule uncertainty high on their lists. But top
 
managers are more concerned about the complexity of the job (how
 
difficult it is), and cost uncertainty (impact on profits) may be
 
highly important also to the top managers in deciding to apply PERT
 
on one type of contract rather than another.5 These two criteria
 
are also high on the list of the PERT staff (with the order reversed).
 
5The history of aerospace contracts shows that the higher the
 
uncertainty or risk in a given project, the greater the tendency
 
toward the cost-reimbursement type of contract. An examination of
 
Table 11-3 shows that it is in these types of contracts that top
 
managers are willing to accept the mandatory imposition of PERT.
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Table II-1
 
RELATIVE WEIGHTS GIVEN TO CRITERIA FOR USING PERT
 
ON ONE TYPE OF CONTRACT VERSUS ANOTHER
 
Group Sampled
 
Industry Group
 
JDirectors
 
Top of PERT PERT
 CGovernment
Group Managers Programs Staff
 
Cost uncertainty 0.87 0.97 0.69 1.00
 
Technical uncertainty 0.59 0.85 0.76 0.80
 
Number of interfaces 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.76
 
Complexity of the job 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.92
 
Schedule uncertainty 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.98
 
Reliability requirements 0.50 0.28 0.30 0.28
 
Type of incentives 0.46 0.62 0.63 0.61
 
Past performance of contractor' 0.61 0.52 0.53 0.58
 
Project priority from customer1
 
viewpoint 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.66
 
Contract price 0.69 0.54 0.44 0.74
 
iLife of contract 0.59 0.54 0.47 0.68
 
aCriteria are listed in the order given in the questionnaire.
 
Source: The questionnaire data.
 
The above findings confirm those of another study on PERT by
 
6
 
Peter P. Schoderbek at the University of Michigan. Schoderbek's
 
6Peter P. Schoderbek, PERT - An Evaluation and Investigation of
 
its Applications and Extensions (Ph.D. dissertation, The University
 
of Michigan, 1964).
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study was directed at all types of industry; it did not focus on
 
7
 
the aerospace industry, nor did it include a government group.
 
Nevertheless, the findings were that the main criteria for the use of
 
PERT, in general, were complexity and size, cost, and time in that
 
8
 
order.
 
Returning to the specific issue of table II-1, it seems that in
 
deciding whether to apply PERT on one type of contract or another
 
(for example, fixed versus cost-reimbursement contracts), uncertainty
 
(in time, cost, or job complexity) is the major criterion. High
 
uncertainties, in the opinion of the respondents, require the use of
 
PERT in a particular kind of contract; conversely, the type of contract
 
should determine whether the government can require the use of PERT.
 
This conclusion is based on the responses to question 8: "In your
 
opinion, should the type of contract (e.g., CPIF) have anything to do
 
with the customer requiring PERT?" The responses to the latter
 
question are summarized in table II2.
 
7The study is descriptive and exploratory and does not delve
 
into questions of public policy.
 
8Schoderbek, 2p. cit., p. 72.
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Table 11-2 
SHOULD THE TYPE OP CONTRACT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
THE CUSTOMER REQUIRING PERT?
 
(answers in percent of those sampled)
 
Response 
Group Yes No 
Government 68% 32% 
Industry 
Top managers 71 29 
Directors of 
PERT programs 63 27 
PERT staff 67 33 
Source: The questionnaire data.
 
Most of those who answered "yes," as indicated in Table 11-2,
 
believed that the customer had the right to require the use of PERT
 
only in cost-reimbursement contracts (the government group, excepted)0
 
This is shown in table 11-3, which summarizes question 9: "If 'yes'
 
on question 8, in which of the following contract types should the
 
customer require PERT? Please check the appropriate boxes in the
 
table below and give the reason for your choice, if any."
 
Table 11-3 shows that there is almost complete agreement between
 
the government and industry groups that the customer should require
 
PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts. This agreement extends to time
 
and material contracts, but does not cover all types of fixed-price
 
contracts. Table 11-3 is significant in that it focuses attention
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on the use of PERT in fixed-price contracts as a source of controversy.
 
The reasoning given by the respondents for the choices shown in
 
table 11-3 is described, by the types of contracts, in the sections
 
below. Major attention is given to those areas where the opinions
 
of the respondents differ substantially.
 
Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
 
An overwhelming majority of the groups sampled advocated the
 
use of PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts. The reason given was
 
that this type of contract was suitable for use only when the uncer­
tainties involved in contract performance were of such magnitude that
 
the cost of performance could not be estimated with sufficient reason­
ableness. Hence, the use of PERT in such contracts would be essential
 
for planning and control by the customer.
 
The respondents associated the use of PERT with contracts where
 
the customer carried most of the risk. One, a supervisor of analytical
 
programming, expressed this idea by stating: "PERT should be used only
 
when the customer has a substantial risk. Where this risk is vested
 
in the contractor, financial control from the outside should be minimized."
 
Fixed-Price Contracts
 
There was marked disagreement between the government and the
 
aerospace industry group about the government's use of PERT in fixed­
price contracts. This disagreement is illustrated below, by group.
 
The Government Group. The majority of the government group advo­
cated the use of PERT in all fixed-price contracts, with the exception
 
of the firm fixed-price contract (see table 11-3). In the case of
 
fixed-price with escalation, fixed-price with redetermination, and
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Table 11-3 
IN WHICH OF THE CONTRACT TYPES LISTED SHOULD THE
 
CUSTOMER REQUIRE PERT?
 
Contract type Group 
Cost-reimbursement contracts 
Cost and cost sharing Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
Cost plus fixed fee 
Cost plus incentive fee 
PERT staff 
Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Fixed price contracts 
Fixed-price with escalation 
Fixed-price with redetermi­
nation 
Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Government 
Fixed-price with incentive 
fee 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Government 
Firm fixed-price 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Other contracts 
Time and material Government 
Top managers 
Directors 
PERT staff 
Source: The questionnaire data. 
Yes 

6W 

76 

55 

86 

93 

100 

85 

100 

93 

100 

85 

86 

50 
24 

25 

29 

57 

1I 
30 

29 
57 
35 

.30 

29 

21 

0 

20 

7 

29 

29 

40 

43 

Response 
No 
No 
opinion 
14 
6 
10 
7 
7 
0 
5 
0 
7 
0 
5 
7 
22 
18 
35 
7 
0 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
10 
7 
36 
70 
45 
50 
14 
6 
30 
21 
29 
76 
57 
14 
12 
25 
14 
29 
590 
5 
57 
72 
100 
60 
86 
14 
25 
14 
7 
0 
20 
7 
43 28 
59 12 
35 25 
29 28 
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fixed-price with incentive fee, the government group felt that the
 
use of PERT facilitated contract negotiations and revisions, which
 
were the major features of those contracts. In the words of one
 
procurement officer, "PERT is necessary in these types of contracts
 
because it offers a detailed history of the costs incurred."
 
The firm fixed-price contract provided for a price that was not
 
subject to any adjustment. Hence, the government group felt that
 
the customer had no valid argument for requiring the use of PERT in
 
these contracts.
 
The Industry Grou. The industry group generally felt that
 
PERT, when imposed as a contract requirement, encroached upon the
 
contractor's freedom of management, which was contrary to the purpose
 
of fixed-price contracting. Furthermore, the underlying philosophy
 
of fixed-price contracting obviated the government's need for PERT,
 
according to the majority of the industry respondents. One assistant
 
vice president for finance answered simply, "If costs are fixed, the
 
procuring agency does not need PERT."
 
Table 11-3 shows that the directors of PERT programs are not as
 
strong in this feeling as the other two subgroups. This is because
 
a substantial number felt that, with the exception of firm fixed­
price contracts, the use of PERT in fixed-price contracts facilitated
 
contract negotiations with the customer.
 
Time and Material Contracts
 
The Government Group. In the government group, a plurality
 
(43 percent.) felt that the use of PERT in time and material contracts
 
was not necessary. The reason generally given for that attitude was
 
-19­
that time and material (TSM) contracts were usually small, in terms
 
of dollars, and straightforward, in terms of planning and control.
 
A minority (29 percent).;, on the other hand, advocated the use of
 
PERT in T&M contracts because these contracts did not offer the
 
contractor any positive profit incentive to control the cost of
 
materials or to manage his labor force effectively.
 
The Industry Group. The opinions of the top managers coincided
 
with those of the government group., Fifty-nine percent stated that
 
time and material contracts were rare, usually small, granted either
 
because objectives were obscure or effort was of small consequence.
 
Hence there was no need for PERT. Twenty-nine percent stated that
 
PERT would be useful in time and materials contracts, giving the same
 
reason put forth by the government group minority.
 
The plurality of managers of the PERT programs and the members
 
of the PERT staff (40 percent'and 43 percent, respectively) advocated
 
the use of PERT in time and material contracts for reasons given
 
above. Again these facts appear in Table 11-3.
 
Research Findings
 
Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
 
The findings of this study indicate that the government has a
 
valid argument for requiring PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts.
 
The uncertainties involved in the performance of most cost-reimburse­
ment contracts are generally of such magnitude that the cost of per­
formance cannot be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
 
As long as the government is paying all allowable costs, it should
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have the duty and the privilege to monitor the programs as closely
 
as it desires9 PERT is, then, a proper technique, if the government
 
chooses to use it.
 
The responses to the questionnaire survey support the above
 
conclusion. Table 11-3 shows that both the government and the industry
 
groups indicated overwhelmingly that the customer should be able to
 
require the use of PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts if he chooses
 
to do so.
 
The study demonstrates, therefore, that there is agreement on
 
this issue by the government and industry groups surveyed. Such
 
agreement is based upon a logical interpretation of the ASPR relating
 
to type of contract. The author, therefore, recommends that the
 
government apply PERT to all cost-reimbursement contracts, subject to
 
the constraints of type of project and threshold contract prices
 
which are defined later in this chapter.
 
Fixed-Price Contracts
 
In fixed-price contracts, the contractor is generally responsible
 
for the cost of a satisfactory completion of the agreement; the risk
 
is the contractor's. The government, therefore, should disengage
 
itself from planning and controlling such contracts, or from suggest­
ing the planning and control tools to be used. PERT should not be
 
required in fixed-price contracts.
 
This conclusion is supported, at least in part, by responses to
 
the questionnaire survey. The industry group states that it objects
 
to the PERT requirement on all fixed-price contracts for the reason
 
given above. The government agrees, but only as applied to firm
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fixed-price contracts (see table 11-3). On the other hand, the
 
majority in the government group are of the opinion that the government
 
should require PERT in the three other categories of fixed-price
 
contracts: fixed-price with escalation, fixed-price with redetermination,
 
and fixed-price with incentive fee.
 
The author will now present his arguments against the requirement
 
of PERT in any type of fixed-price contract. The four types of con­
tracts will be discussed in order. These are: the firm fixed-price,
 
the fixed-price with escalation, the fixed-price with redetermination,
 
and the fixed-price with incentive contract.
 
Firm Fixed-Price Contracts. There are two reasons why the
 
government personnel sampled are willing to exclude firm fixed-price
 
contracts from a PERT requirement. First, the firm fixed-price con­
tract places a maximum risk upon the contractor. According to the ASPR:
 
The firm fixed-price contract provides for a
 
price which is not subject to any adjustment
 
by reason of the cost experience of the con­
tractor in the performance of the contract.
 
This type of contract, when appropriately
 
applied as set forth below, places maximum
 
risk upon the contractor. Because the con­
tractor assumes full responsibility, in the
 
form of profits and losses, for all costs
 
under or over the firm fixed-price, he has
 
a maximum profit incentive for effective
 
cost control and contract performance.9
 
Second, the aerospace industry has become greatly alarmed by
 
statements emanating from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the effect
 
that it would be wise for aerospace firms to be able to PERT fixed­
price contracts. The aerospace industry is jealous of its right to
 
9ASPR, op1. cit.
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manage fixed-price contracts without interference from the government.
 
The issue is particularly clear in the case of firm fixed-price
 
contracts, because as Frederic M. Scherer puts it:
 
The firm fixed-price contract corresponds most
 
directly to the contractual relationship pre­
vailing in a market environment. With it the
 
contractor promises to supply certain specified
 
goods or services at a price which, after agreed
 
upon by buyer and seller, is not subject t6
 
adjustments reflecting the seller's actual cost
 
experience.10
 
How a contractor arrives at a bid in a firm fixed-price contract
 
should not be revealed to the government in a PERT network cost
 
analysis, according to a majority of the industry questionnaire
 
respondents. Furthermore, how a contractor manages a firm fixed-price
 
contract is for him to decide, as this management is directly correlated
 
with his profit. The contractor usually has sufficient incentive for
 
managing firm fixed-price contracts efficiently because for every dollar
 
of cost reduction his profits are increased a dollar.
11
 
The PERT requirement in any contract creates a hardship for a
 
contractor as a result of the cost associated with acquiring PERT
 
capability. It is demonstrated in Chapter IV that for the cases
 
inyestigated this cost is in excess of $200,000. The outcry of the
 
industry against the thinly-veiled coercion implied in the statements
 
from DOD is justified. The industry makes it clear that it does not
 
10Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic
 
Incentives (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Division of Research, Graduate
 
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1964), p. 132.
 
lIbid.
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wish to have its firm fixed-price contracts monitored.12 Apparently
 
this is the reason why the government group represented in this survey
 
shows little desire to force PERT on firm fixed-price contracts.
 
Thus, there is an agreement between the groups surveyed upon the
 
disengagement of the government from the administration (or PERTing)
 
of firm fixed-price contracts. There is no agreement, however, in
 
the case of the other types of fixed-price contracts. The government
 
group believes that in fixed-price with escalation contracts, fixed­
price with redetermination, and fixed-price with incentive fee con­
tracts, it should require PERT because a part of the risk is being
 
shared with the contractor.
 
Fixed-Price Contracts with Escalation The fixed-price contract
 
with escalation provides for the revision of the agreed price upon
 
the occurrence of certain contingencies which are specifically defined
 
in the contract. The risks, to either party, are reduced by the
 
inclusion of escalation provisions.
 
The fixed-price contract with escalation is only appropriate
 
where serious doubt exists as to the stability of market and labor
 
conditions. It is normally not employed when the economy is stable.
 
The questionnaire survey, for example, failed to uncover one fixed­
price contract with escalation among the cases reported. Even if
 
1 2This is stated categorically in the National Security Industrial
 
Association's Report of PERT. PERT Cost and Line of Balance for Sub­
mission to Government PERT and Line of Balance Coordinating Groups
 
(Washington, D. C.: April 1964), p. 16.
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there were such contracts, the cost of applying PERT to them would be
 
prohibitive because of continuous revisions, It would, therefore, be
 
unwise to apply PERT to this type of contract0
 
Fixed-Price Contracts with Redetermination. The fixed-price
 
contract with redetermination provides for a ceiling price and for a
 
retroactive price redetermination after completion of the contract.
 
The ASPR states that the redetermined price should be negotiated so
 
as to give weight to the management effectiveness and ingenuity
 
exhibited by the contractor during performance. It also specifies that
 
the basis of such negotiation should be fully discussed with the
 
contractor where this type of agreement is made.
 
The fixed-price contract with redetermination is appropriate
 
in procurements where it is established at the time of negotiation
 
that a fair and reasonable firm fixed-price cannot be established,
 
and where the amount involved is so small, or the time of performance
 
so short, that any other type of contract is impracticable.
 
It will be shown in chapter IV that as the contract price becomes
 
smaller, the cost of applying PERT (in percent) becomes higher. Soon,
 
the cost is too high to warrant the expense, As the fixed-price con­
tract with redetermination is not to be used unless the procurement
 
is for research and development at an estimated cost of $100,000 or
 
less, the use of PERT in this type of contract is not recommended.
 
Significantly, the questionnaire survey uncovered no samples of such a
 
contract in the cases reported.
 
Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts. The fixed-price incentive con­
tract provides for adjustment of profit, for the establishment of the
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final contract price by a formula based on the relationship which
 
final negotiated total cost bears to total target costs , The formula
 
may be expressed by
 
+
'=t (ct - Ca) (I1 
where
 
'it=profit earned by the contractor,
 
/t = target profit,
 
Ct =target costs,
 
C = actual costs, and
 
13
 
a = a sharing proportion, ranging from zero to one.
The magnitude of a in equation (II-1) determines the relative
 
risk carried by the government. In the typical fixed-price incentive
 
contract, a is about 0,20.14
 
According to the ASPR, the fixed-price incentive contract is 
appropriate when use of the firm fixed-price contract is inappropriate, 
and when the supplies and services being procured are of such a nature 
that assumption of a degree of cost responsibility by the contractor 
is likely to provide him with a positive profit incentive for effective 
cost control and contract performance
. 
The ASPR states that contract 
performance requirements must be such that there is reasonable oppor­
tunity for the incentive provisions to have a meaningful impact on the 
manner in which the contractor manages the work. The fixed-price 
13With a = 0, the contract becomes a cost-plus-fixed-fee con­
tract; with a = 1, the contract becomes a firm fixed-price contract.
 
14Michael D. Intriligator, "Optimal Incentive Contracts"
 
(unpublished paper, July 16, 1964), p. 2.
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incentive contract is not to be used, according to ASPR, unless the
 
contractor's accounting system is adequate for price revision purposes
 
and permits satisfactory application of the profit and price adjustment
 
formulas.
 
Therefore, the author questions the utility of-the government's
 
use of PERT in fixed-price incentive contracts. It would appear that the
 
two should be mutually exclusive,15 That this is not the case is
 
demonstrated by responses to the questionnaire survey. Thirteen of the
 
sixty-one cases reported use of PERT in EPIF contracts; in ten of
 
these, PERT is a contractual requirement.
 
Although the government shoulders part of the risk contracts based
 
on fixed-price with escalation, fixed-price with redetermination, and
 
fixed-price with incentive fee, the fact remains that the contractor
 
16
 
carries the heavier risk. Since the major risk is carried by the
 
contractor, it is he who should determine the planning and control tools
 
appropriate for his job. Furthermore, it is more economical from a
 
cost-effectiveness point of view for the government to divert resources
 
(in terms of costs incurred in PERTing fixed-price contracts) to more
 
productive endeavors.
 
Other Contracts
 
Other types of contracts, such as time and material, are significant
 
1 5According to the ASPR, the government awards an FPIF contract
 
only after it has determined that the contractor possesses satisfactory
 
controls. If the contractor is prepared to furnish such controls, why
 
should PERT be required?
 
1 6This is true in theory at least. The author has been told by
 
many procurement officers that they have traditionally allowed the
 
contractors to minimize their risks in these types of contracts--that
 
in a sense there are really no actual fixed-price contracts.
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in terms of systems development or procurement of hardware. In,
 
addition, these contracts have traditionally dealt with simple,
 
straightforward projects that do not require sophisticated planning
 
and control methods. The government has no need, therefore, to require
 
the use of PERT in these other contracts0
 
To summarize the above arguments, it appears necessary for the
 
government to require the use of PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts
 
because it carries a preponderant share of the cost uncertainties.
 
The converse, however, is true for fixed-price contracts. The author
 
recommends, therefore, that the government apply PERT to cost­
reimbursement contracts but refrain from such a requirement in fixed­
price contracts.
 
The above recommendation is consistent with the philosophy of
 
relaxation of controls under study at present by the United States Air
 
Force. According to the Air Force Procurement Newsletter, it is the.
 
long-held opinion of the aerospace industry that the Air Force over­
controls weapon producers--indeed, that new controls are added faster
 
17
 
than old ones are removed. As a result, Assistant Secretary of the
 
Air Force Joseph S. Imirie has indicated a willingness to take reasonable
 
risks when justified by potential gains; he directed a study to reduce
 
controls.18 On the basis of that study, the PERT requirement was
 
removed from a Federal Electric cost-plus-incentive-fee contract at
 
1 7
"Contract Management," Air Force Procurement Newsletter, No. 1
 
(September 196'I), p. 15.
 
1 8Ibid. This directive was issued to Lt. General T. P. Garrity,
 
DCS/S&L, on April 9, 1963.
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the request of Federal Electric, but this was done only after the
 
company demonstrated that it possessed a comparable system to do the
 
job.19
 
Lieutenant General T. P. Garrity, Deputy Chief of Staff for
 
Systems and Logistics, Headquarters, United Stated Air Force, expressed
 
this philosophy of relaxation of controls as follows:
 
"...as we move further into fixed-price and
 
incentive contracting we are not only will­
ing but anxious to reduce, in a sensible
 
manner, the controls and close surveillance
 
we found necessary in the past in cost-plus­
fixed-fee contracting.",20
 
Generally, the government is becoming aware of the need to be
 
selective in the application of controls. F6r one thing, it is
 
believed that the growth of total procurement costs has been insigni­
21
 
ficant except in the ease of cost-reimbursement contracts. Fn
 
another, there is the increasing pressure of the philosophy that the
 
government should interfere less in the affairs of contractors.
 
191nformation obtained in correspondence between the Air Force
 
and the author0
 
20Speech by Lt. General T. P. Garrity, DCS/Systems and Logistics,
 
HQ USAF to the Industrial Association Convention, Sheraton Park
 
Hotel (Washington, D. C.: September 13, 1963).
 
21This statement is based on privileged correspondence with
 
Headquarters, United States Air Force, made available to this author.
 
CHAPTER III
 
PERT AND PROJECT TYPE
 
There are three general types of projects that are involved in
 
the weapons and aerospace acquisition processes, These are in the areas
 
of basic research, research and development (R&D), and repetitive
 
production. The proper role of PERT in each of these areas is dependent
 
upon the nature of the activities.
 
PERT has been used to date only in the R&D phase of procurement
 
contracts. A memorandum dated January 18, 1963, from the Director of
 
Defense Research and Engineering at that time, pointed out that "the
 
Secretary of Defense has previously encouraged the use of PERT/Cost
 
as a management tool in research and engineering efforts," and he
 
recommended that each Service "use its judgment in determining the
 
types of projects to which it should be applied." This position was
 
later amended so that PERT would apply to two R&D categories only:
 
engineering development and operational system development. The
 
rationale underlying this decision was that these two categories are
 
later stages of development where high cost estimates have a serious
 
impact on expenditures.
 
Some government officials concerned with procurement problems
 
have suggested that PERT should be made applicable to other stages of
 
R&D and even to basic research and production projects. Thus PERT
 
would become the principal management technique used in procurement.
 
Although this problem is a very important one, no discussion or
 
iMemorandum to the three Services, from Harold Brown, Director of
 
Defense Research and Engineering, January 18, 1963.
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examination of the possibility of extending the use of PERT to other
 
project types has appeared in any government publication , The USAF
 
PERT Implementation Manual merely mentions the fact that PERT has never
 
been used in a production phase.2 For repetitive production, the line
 
of balance (LOB) technique is an excellent management tool. But because
 
the line of balance does not have the forecasting qualities of PERT,
 
efforts were at one time made to extend PERT into the production field.
3
 
PERT, on the other hand, has been used successfully in construc­
tion programs0 According to a February, 1963, article in the Sunday
 
edition of the Los Angeles Times, construction companies using the
 
Critical Path Method (CPM) were achieving reductions of from 5 percent
 
to 30 percent in time, and 2 percent to 25 percent in costs. The same
 
article cited the Stonegate Estates' development in California's Simi
 
Valley as an example of the use of CPM.
 
A pertinent feature of construction programs, however, is that
 
they combine R&D and production. Where PERT has applicability, con­
struction programs are often "one-time-through" projects. In this
 
sense, construction may be thought of as one of the categories of R&D.
 
The entire problem of the types of projects where PERT can be
 
applied is extremely complicated. Even though extending PERT to some
 
of the categories or stages of R&D other than engineering developments
 
2Air Force Systems Command, USAF PERT Implementation Manual,
 
August 1, 1963, p. 9.
 
3This statement is based on an interview with A. W. Buschman,
 
Head of the PERT Coordinating Group, Department of Defense, Washington,
 
D. C., April 1, 1964.
 
4Tom Cameron, "Missile Program Gives Builders Key to Efficient
 
Production," Los Angeles Times, February 16, 1964, Section J, p. 1.
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and operational system development may achieve more effective management
 
and cost control, it will be seen that the use of PERT in certain areas,
 
such as repetitive production, is not desirable.
 
Analysis of the Questionnaire
 
Table III-1 shows the relative importance assigned by the
 
questionnaire respondents to the type of project where PERT should be
 
applied.
 
Table I1-i
 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO TYPE OF PROJECT WHERE
 
PERT SHOULD BE APPLIED
 
Groups Sampled
 
Industry Group
 
Directors
 
Type of project where PERT Government Top of PERT PERT
 
should be applied group managers programs Istaff
 
Basic research 0.16 0.35 0.49 0.37
 
R&D 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 
Production 0.80 0.43 0.32 0.26
 
,Other: military construction x x x x
 
Source: The questionnaire data.
 
It can be seen that there is unanimous agreement that PERT should
 
be applied to R&D projects, but there is only minor support for the
 
5
 
application of PERT to basic research or to production. All the
 
5The exception is the government group, which supports the applica­
tion of PERT to production projects.
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groups sampled advocate the application of PERT to military con­
struction projects.
 
Research Findings
 
Basic Research
 
PERT cannot be used in basic research projects because it is
 
difficult, if not impossible, in such situations to define network
 
events, or to estimate the duration and cost of activities with
 
reasonable accuracy. PERT is based on a definable network; there must
 
be an element of certainty attached to that definition. In basic
 
research, however, this element is lacking. For example, only one
 
questionnaire response referred to a basic research project and the
 
respondent stated that PERT was not applicable. This illustrates
 
the general attitude of the questionnaire respondents with respect
 
to the use of PERT in basic research (see table III-1).
 
The PERT literature generally supports the findings of table III-1.
 
In particular, the literature shares the skepticism of many ques­
tionnaire respondents as to whether PERT's range of applicability
 
includes basic research. For instance, the editor of the IRE Trans­
actions on Engineering Management has stated:
 
We have taken the time to study a great many trees
 
of research -- and even when these relate to the
 
"development" of new drugs, we have found that you
 
could not with knowledge available at the time
 
have predicted the sequencing of events, a priori. 
We have checked this in other labs. --- At any
 
given stage, you have the probability of new know­
ledge - which is why you do the research - but you
 
do not know how many steps or what specific events
 
are going to take place before the new knowledge
 
appears. 
6IRE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. EM-7, No. 3
 
(September, 1960), p. 81.
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The conclusion of this study is, therefore, that the government
 
should not attempt to use PERT in basic research projects, since these
 
projects are not amenable to the reasonable cost and time estimates
 
that PERT requires. Moreover, basic research projects do not involve
 
the vast sums of money that would normally make the use of PERT
 
profitable.
 
Research and Development
 
A thorough study of the literature, as well as interviews in
 
the aerospace industry and in government, indicate that PERT is
 
applicable to one-time-through R&D projects. The questionnaire survey
 
verifies this. As shown in table III-1, the respondents are in
 
agreement that PERT is applicable to R&D projects. There are six
 
categories of research and development: research, exploratory develop­
ment, advanced developments, engineering developments, management and
 
support, and operational system development.
 
The reader may recall that DOD Directive 3200.9 directs the
 
application of PERT/Cost to major engineering developments and opera­
tional system development projects (those exceeding $25 million in
 
RDT&E, or $100 million in production investment). The rationale for
 
the selection of these two groups is that major development projects
 
in the later stages of development have the most serious impact on
 
total expenditure and on defense capability. The indicated categories
 
represent projects in the later stages of development, projects that
 
are better-defined than those in the earlier stages. As mentioned
 
earlier, definition of events and activities is the backbone of PERT,
 
It is possible to apply PERT to categories of R&D other than
 
engineering developments and operational system development. As may
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be seen in table 111-2, only one-half of the "PERTed" projects report­
ed in the questionnaire survey belong to these two R&D categories0
 
TableII-2 shows that the balance are exploratory development or
 
advanced development projects as well as projects that are a combina­
tion of a number of R&D categories. In one case, for example, the
 
project included the entire range from research through operational
 
system development.
 
It is also interesting to note in table 111-2 that there is only
 
one case where PERT/Time is being used in management and support.
 
Management and support include military construction, and PERT/Time
 
has been of unquestionable merit in that area.
 
This author recommends the use of PERT in all six categories of
 
R&D for the reason that a particular R&D program generally includes
 
all or most of these categories. The aerospace industry has already
 
demonstrated its capability to apply PERT in this way, as illustrated
 
in table 111-2.
 
Repetitive Production
 
Responses to the questionnaire survey indicate that, of the firms
 
responding, twelve are working on repetitive production contracts but
 
only three of these are using PERT to plan and control such contracts.
 
The latter state that PERT is useful in production contracts where
 
the time from beginning to completion of the project is long, say
 
twenty-four months, and where the number of items produced is small0
 
These are the types of production projects where PERT is being used.
 
The interviewees state that generally there have been no problems,
 
of schedule slippages or cost-overruns, related to the inadequacy of
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existing controls in production contracts. These controls, such as
 
the line of balance, have been, and are, still adequate.
 
Table 111-2
 
FREQUENCY OF THE USE OF PERT IN R&D AND OTHER
 
CATEGORIES FOR THE CASES REPORTED
 
PERT/Time PERT/Cost 
R&D and other categories frequency frequency 
Research (a) 0 
Exploratory development (b) 0 2 
Advanced developments (c) 3 5 
Engineering developments (d) 5 ii 
Management and support (e) 1 0 
Operational system development (f) 8 7 
a + b 0 2 
a thru f 1 0 
b thru f 1 0 
c+d 1 0 
c+f 2 0 
d+f 1 1 
PDP* 1 3 
Early production* 2 2 
Construction 1 0 
Total 27 34 
*Other categories.
 
Source: The questionnaire data.
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Thus this study has not uncovered a need for the use of PERT in
 
repetitive production.
 
On the other hand, PERT is useful in the area of military con­
struction, which falls in the realm of'management and support--an
 
R&D category. A few questionnaire respondents, however, are of the
 
opinion that military construction belongs in the area of production.
 
Whether military construction programs are considered R&D or production
 
projects, the literature, the interviews, and the questionnaire survey
 
(see table III-1) suggest that PERT may be successfully used in these
 
programs.
 
On the basis of the analysis concerning the use of PERT in basic
 
research, research and development (R&D), and production projects,
 
the author recommends that PERT should be applied to research and
 
development and military construction projects only.
 
This recommendation is subject to constraints relating to the
 
type of contract and to threshold contract prices. The former was
 
discussed in chapter II and the latter is considered in chapter IV.
 
CHAPTER IV
 
PERT AND THRESHOLD CONTRACT PRICE
 
DOD Directive 3200.9, originally issued on February 26, 196-,
 
makes mandatory the application of PERT for each program passing
 
through engineering development and operational system developments
 
that exceed $25 million in research, test, development, and evalua­
tion (RTD&E), or $100 million in production investment.1 The directive,
 
however, was primarily concerned with the project definition phase,
 
or what was later called contract definition. As for PERT, the
 
directive only reiterated the substance of a memorandum from Dr. Harold
 
Brown, now Secretary of the Air Force, who at that time was Director
 
of Defense Research and Engineering. In reference to PERT, the
 
memorandum stated:
 
Projects requiring cumulative RTD&E funding in
 
the engineering development or in the operational
 
system development categories in excess of twenty­
five million dollars will undergo this process

unless this requirement is specifically waived by me....
 
Apparently some confusion remained in the Department of Defense,
 
however, about PERT and threshold project costs in the interval between
 
Brownts memorandum and McNamarats directive, Eight months after
 
Brown's memorandum, Mr. Barry Schuler (of the Control Data Corporation,
 
Minneapolis, Minnesota) asked Mr. A. W. Buschman (head of the PERT
 
IDOD Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense Robert S. MNamara,
 
February 26, 1964, pp. 2 and 5. This directive was cancelled and
 
superseded by another DOD Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense
 
McNamara, dated July 1, 1965. For the purposes of this study, these
 
two directives are identical.
 
2Memorandum to the three Services, from Harold Brown, Director of
 
Defense Research and Engineering, January 18, 1963.
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Coordinating Group, DOD) if the Department of Defense had established
 
a minimum dollar value for the imposition of PERT/Cost, and the answer
 
" was "no. 
For all intents and purposes, DOD Directive 3200.9 formally
 
establishes minimum dollar values for the imposition of PERT/Cost.
 
There is no clue in the current literature, however, to the rationale
 
underlying these minimum values. In response to an inquiry to the
 
Department of Defense by this author, the following explanation was given
 
by Mr. James W. Roach:
 
Existing directions to the Military Departments
 
regarding application of PERT/Cost are contained
 
in Director of Defense Research and Engineering
 
memorandum dated January 18, 1963 and DOD Direc­
tive 3200.9 dated February 26, 1964. The memo­
randum directs application of PERT/Cost to major
 
Engineering Development and Operational Systems
 
Development projects and permits Departmental
 
judgment in determining the magnitude and types
 
of projects to which it should be applied. The
 
DOD Directive concerns Project Definition Phase,
 
of which P/C is only one aspect. Thus at the
 
present time the Departments are required to use
 
P/C for all projects undergoing a Project Defini­
tion Phase and are encouraged to use P/C for
 
other major Engineering Development and Operation­
al Systems Development projects. The Departments
 
are applying P/C to many more projects than they
 
are required to. We are considering direction to
 
the Departments which will require use of P/C for
 
Engineering Development and Operational Systems
 
Development projects at lower dollar levels than
 
those of DOD Directive 3200.9. The depth of P/C
 
effort would depend upon the dollar level of the
 
project.
 
With regard to the criteria of DOD Directive
 
3200.9, it is important to recognize that there
 
3DOD PERT Coordinating Group, Government-Industry PERT/Cost
 
Conference Prnceedings, Rock Island, Illinois, October 1 and 2,
 
1963 (document unpaginated).
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are two criteria: that the project be in Engineer­
ing Development or Operational Systems Development

(both of these categories represent items being

developed for operational use and thus are in the
 
later stages of development) and that the estimated
 
RDT&E funding be $25 million or more or estimated
 
production investment be $100 million or more. 
The
 
rationale is that major development projects in the
later stages of development with high dollar
 
estimates have the most serious impact on our total
 
expenditures and on our defense capability. 
The
 
application of the complete Project Definition Phase
 
discipline is reserved for a relatively small number
 
of the most important projects. The discipline of
 
P/C is intended to be applied on a broader basis.
 
No formal quantitative analysis was conducted to
 
arrive at the criteria for PDP. The criteria were
 
selected against the background of the existing

budget and projections for several years, but with­
out formal quantitative analysis. The intent was
 
to set criteria which would limit the application of
 
PDP initially to a small number of major development
projects, 
 It is possible that after more experience

with PDP the criteria will be lowered to expand PDP
 
application.4
 
Mr. Roach also stresses that the dollar criterion for the
 
application of PERT/Cost is on a project rather than a contract basis;
 
it would be possible, therefore, for a total project to be in 
excess
 
of the $25 million RDT&E level but the individual contracts below
 
this level0 For example, it is conceivable that the estimated cost
 
of an RDT&E project consisting of several contracts might be approx­
imately $30 million yet one of the contracts amount to less than
 
$100,000. Thus, one difficulty with the directive is that PERT could
 
be applied to very small contracts0 There are, consequently, two
 
problems that arise from this aspect of the directive: first, whether
 
4Letter written to the author by James W. Roach, Assistant Director
 (Engineering Management), Office of the Director of Defense Research
 
and Engineering, Department of Defense, November 24, 1964.
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PERT should be applied on a contract or a project basis; second,
 
whether the PERT threshold prices are justified. 5
 
Analysis of the Questionnaire
 
One of the purposes of the questionnaire was to obtain opinions
 
on the soundness of the threshold contract prices of DOD Directive
 
3200.9o The results of the poll are shown in table IV-1, which is
 
a summary of answers to question 15, Part A, of the questionnaire:
 
"In your judgment, is the $25 million for research, test, development,
 
and evaluation (RDT&E) or $100 million for production investment
 
(minimum program prices that make the application of PERT mandatory)
 
required by DOD Directive 3200.9 a good rule"?
 
Table IV-l
 
OPINIONS OF THE DOD MINIMUM PROJECT CRITERION
 
(in percent of those sampled)
 
Response 
No 
Groups sampled Approve Disapprove opinio 
Government 58% 26% 16% 
Industry 
Top managers 42 42 16 
Directors of 
PERT programs 47 35 18 
PERT staff 52 29 19 
Source: The questionnaire data.
 
5The example is, of course, for illustrative purposes only. 
 It would
 
be rare indeed if a mechanized PERT/Cost system were applied to a
 
$100,000 contract.
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Table IV-l shows a division of opinion with a majority (or plural­
ity) of the respondents approving of the DOD minimum price criterion.
 
It may be interesting to note that & few of those respondents who
 
disapprove Directive 3200.9 do so because they consider the minimum
 
prices of the directive too high. Generally, however, most of the
 
respondents consider these minimum prices necessary for controlling
 
R&D expenditures, although the majority of respondents also recognize
 
that there are more important criteria for the use of PERT than
 
minimum contract price, According to one industry respondent:
 
"There are values, other than money, that should
 
determine the use of PERT, Contracts requiring
 
less money may be very important as far as tech­
nical accomplishment is concerned; and these
 
contracts should be PERTed."
 
Before proceeding to analyze the quantitative portion of the
 
questionnaire (Part B) so that cost functions for both PERT/Time and
 
PERT/Cost are developed, it should be pointed out that one of the
 
main assertions about PERT during the interviews was that its cost was
 
excessive. Some aerospace industry representatives maintained that
 
the cost of using PERT was as high as 8 percent of contract price.
 
Systems project officers interviewed stated that the cost of PERT was
 
instrumental in deciding whether to require its use in a contract.
 
It was necessary, therefore, to shed light on the cost of PERT
 
before recommending principles for its application. Inquiries were
 
made by this author about costs during the interviews; the results of
 
such inquiries were in the form of unofficial or hearsay estimates,
 
such as those shown in table IV-2. The opinions of the cost of PERT
 
differed, as seen in the table, however, the size of the contract was,
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not taken into account. Interviewees were of the opinion,for example,
 
that the larger the contract, the smaller was the percentage cost of
 
PERT. As a result, table IV-2 might reflect differences caused by a
 
variability in contract size.
 
Table IV-2
 
UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF PERT
 
AS A PERCENT OF CONTRACT PRICE
 
Company PERT/Cost PERT/Time 
Hughes 6 ­ 8 percent 2 - 5 percent 
U. S. Navy Unknown 1 percent 
U. S. Air Force Unknown 5 percent 
DOD 1.5 -.2.0 percent Unknown 
Convair 3 - 5 percent oS - 1.5 percen 
Source: 	An interdepartmental memorandum of an aerospace firm
 
made available to the author.
 
It appears, then, that a more accurate expression of the cost of
 
PERT could be obtained if it were related to contract price. Opinions
 
as to the cost of PERT expressed by participants in a PERT/Cost work­
shop conducted by IBM for aerospace industry representatives (December
 
2-3, 1963) are shown in Table IV-3, as a percent of contract price.
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Table IV-3
 
OPINIONS OF THE COST OF PERT AS A PERCENT OF
 
CONTRACT PRICE
 
Contract Under $100,000- $2 million- $50 million- Over
 
price $100,000 $2 million $50 million $100 million $100 million
 
PERT/Time 3.3% 2.3% 2.0% 1.4% 1.0%
 
PERT/Cost 6.1 4.6 3.8 3.0 2.3
 
Source: 	 An interdepartmental memorandum of an aerospace firm made
 
available to this author.
 
Data for tables IV-2 and IV-3 were composed of mere opinions or
 
unofficial estimates; they did not constitute the sound evidence needed
 
for the development of principles for the use of PERT as a function
 
of contract price. A number of systems project officers pointed out,
 
for example, that the aerospace industry was overpricing PERT. If
 
this were true, overpricing might be reflected in the cost data given
 
in tables IV-2 and IV-3.
 
In the endeavor to obtain a more accurate idea of the cost of PERT,
 
questions dealing with the possible determinants of such cost were
 
included in Part B of the questionnaire (see Appendix II).6 Part B
 
was designed so as to deal with one defense or aerospace project PERTed
 
by the responding firm. On the basis of the answers to these questions,
 
it was possible to make rough estimates of the cost of PERT.
 
The respondent first was asked to identify the project reported.
 
This was done in question 1: "What is the name of the project or
 
6Specifically questions 1 to 19 (with the exception of question 9).
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application"? Questions 2 to 19 (with the exception of 9) concerned
 
identification of a range for contract price, a range for contract life,
 
the direct labor and computer hours used in PERTing the project, and
 
other variables of interest.
 
On the basis of the amounts of computer hours reported in answer­
ing question 15, and the direct labor man-months given in replies to
 
question 16, the direct cost of PERT was estimated. The estimating
 
method used by this author assumed standard computer, direct labor,
 
and overhead rates. These were applied equally to all the cases
 
reported in order to maintain comparability.
 
At this point, the reader is reminded that there are no standard
 
costs in the aerospace industry; the estimates given in this chapter
 
are extremely rough and based on suppositions that may not hold true
 
for every firm. The assumptions used in computing the cost of PERT
 
are designed merely to develop a first approximation of the cost of
 
PERT, based solely on contract price.
7
 
This chapter must be viewed, then, as a ground-breaking effort.
 
The charts and equatiQns exhibited in it are simply descriptions of
 
the data gathered from the questionnaire survey and are applicable
 
only to the cases reported.
 
7For a second approximation of the cost of PERT, the reader may
 
refer to Jack C. Hayya, A Study on the Appropriate Use of PERT in
 
Procurement Contracts (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
 
Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 227-239. In addition to contract price, the
 
second approximation accounts for other variables such as type of
 
R&D, type of organization, and the level of detail of the work break­
down structure.
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Cost Estimating Method Used
 
It is assumed in estimating the cost of PERT that its direct
 
operating cost consists of:
 
1. Computer rental costs, and
 
2o Pay (or salaries) of those employed in the PERT operation.
8
 
It is easy to compute data on the monthly direct cost of PERT
 
from responses to Part B of the questionnaire--questions 12, 13, 15 and
 
16 are designed to provide such information. In order to compute the
 
total operating cost of PERT from the direct operating costs, overhead
 
rates must be included0 These rates differ from firm to firm, and from
 
contract to contract.
 
The analysis of the direct cost of PERT only (which does not
 
include overhead) is not meaningful, because Loth industry and govern­
ment refer to the total cost of PERT. Therefore, it is necessary to
 
include overhead rates. Once different overhead rates are applied to
 
accommodate individual firms, however, the comparability of the total
 
costs is destroyed. One standard overhead rate is assumed, then, for
 
all firms. This rate is taken as 150 percent of direct labor hours,
 
and applied, as common practice dictates, to direct labor only.
 
The inclusion of overhead rates in the calculations is reason­
able when one notes that the government is usually paying for PERT
 
as a direct charge. Thus it is paying for: (1) the direct labor hours,
 
and (2) an indirect, or overhead, charge computed by applying an over­
head rate to the direct labor hours. The findings of the questionnaire
 
8See ibid., pp. 389-394, for the computer rental rates and
 
personnel salaries used in the computations.
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survey generally substantiate the above. Responses to question 19
 
("Is the cost of the PERT operation a direct or an indirect charge in
 
this contract?) indicate that 72 percent of the firms replying to
 
Part B of the questionnaire are compensated for PERT as a direct charge.
 
A First Approximation of the Total Operating Cost of PERT
 
The total operating cost of PERT is calculated by multiplying
 
the total monthly cost by the estimated life of the contract. The
 
estimated life of the contract, in months, is based on answers to
 
question 3, Part B of the questionnaire: "What is the duration range
 
for the life of the contract in months"? The middle point of that range
 
is assumed to be the estimated life of the contract for the project
 
under consideration.
 
Figures IV-l and IV-2 present scatter diagrams and linear
 
regressions for the total operating costs of PERT/Time and PERT/Cost
 
as a function of contract price. The linear regression equation for
 
PERT/Time is:
 
Y = 0.206 + 0.00156 X (IV-l)
 
where
 
Y = total operating cost of PERT/Time, in millions of dollars, and
 
X = contract price, in millinns of dollars4
 
The correlation coefficient of the variables in equation IV-l is
 
0.70. The standard error of the estimate is 0.198.
 
9This applies also to establishing point estimates for contract
 
prices. It wnuld have been easier, of course, to work with the actual
 
figures for contract duration and price. In testing the questionnaire,

however, it was evident that respondents had grave reservations about
 
divulging the specific data because of proprietary or national security

considerations. Ranges were then agreed upon as a satisfactory ccmpromise.
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The linear regression equation for PERT/Cost is:
 
Y = 0.293 + 0.00447 X (IV-2)
 
where
 
Y = total operating cost of PERT/Cost in millions of dollars, and
 
X = contract price, in millions of dollars.
 
The correlation coefficient of the variables in equation IV-2
 
is 0.70. Thestandard error of the estimate is 0.671.
 
It is important to note the fixed costs associated with equations
 
IV-1 and IV-2 above: $0.206 million for PERT/Time and $0.293 million
 
for PERT/Cost. These high fixed costs lend credence to the hypothesis
 
that it is easier for larger firms than for smaller ones to use PERT,
 
because larger firms are more apt to possess the necessary funds.
 
Koontz and O'Donnell point this out as follows:
 
A large firm can almost certainly engage in
 
more thorough planning than a small one, be­
cause the ratio of planning expense to oper­
ating expense or to capital resources will be
 
small. Since many planning problems which
 
face the small firm are almost as complex and
 
varied as those which face the larger firm,
 
in the area of planning thoroughness and the
 
resources to accomplish it, the larger firm
 
has an important advantage.10
 
The analysis of the questibnnaire data reflected in equations
 
IV-l and IV-2 supports the above statement. Small firms evidently
 
have more difficulty than larger firms in implementing PERT because
 
of their more limited resources.
 
10Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management
 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 196-197.
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A First Approximation of the Cost of PERT as a Percentage of Contract
 
Price
 
The cost of PERT as a percentage of contract price is the most
 
meaningful index of the cost of PERT because it shows the fraction
 
contributed by PERT to the total cost of the contract. The percentage
 
cost of PERT is calculated by dividing the total cost of PERT
 
(equations IV-l and IV-2) by the contract price. This yields the
 
hyperbolic functions of figures IV-3 and IV-4. These functions are
 
similar to the classical average fixed cost functions. As pointed
 
out earlier, there is a fixed cost associated with acquiring a PERT
 
capability. This fixed cost is responsible for the shape of the
 
curves of figures IV-3 and IV-4.
 
Figures IV-3 and IV-4 present scatter diagrams of the percentage
 
costs of PERT/Time and PERT/Cost as a function of contract price, in
 
addition to being the hyperbolic fits discussed in the preceding par­
agraph. The equation of the fit for PERT/Time is:
 
X (y - 0.156) = 20.6 (IV-3) 
where
 
X = contract price in millions of dollars, and
 
y = the cost of PERT/Time as a percentage of contract price.
 
For PERT/Cost, the equation of the fit is:
 
X (y - 0.447) = 29.3 (IV-4) 
where 
X = contract price in millions of dollars, and 
y = the cost of PERT/Cost as a percentage of contract price. 
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Research Findings
 
A comparison of figures IV-3 and IV-4 reveals that it is less
 
costly in terms of percentage costs to use PERT/Time than to use
 
PERT/Cost. Conversely, given a percentage cost constraint, PERT/Time
 
can be applied in smaller contracts than can PERT/Cost. For example,
 
if the government is willing to pay no more than one percent of con­
tract price for planning and control, it has the choice, according to
 
data shown in figures IV-3 and IV-, to apply PERT/Time to contracts
 
that exceed $25 million or to apply PERT/Cost to contracts in excess
 
of $62.5 million.
 
A study of figure IV- is of interest from the standpoint of
 
Department of Defense Directive 3200.9 (dated July 1, 1965). As stated
 
previously, this directive requires the use of PERT/Cost in all
 
engineering developments and operational systems developments estimated
 
to require cumulative RDT&E financing in excess of $25 million or
 
estimated to require a total production investment in excess of
 
$100 million. The percentage costs associated with these threshold
 
contract prices, according to figure IV-4, are 1.6 percent and 0.8
 
percent, respectively. On the basis of figure IV-4, the threshold
 
contract prices of DOD Directive 3200.9 seem reasonable, particularly
 
in view of the fact that these threshold contract prices were chosen
 
without the benefit of a quantitative analysis.
 
Is the Cost of PERT Excessive?
 
Equations IV-3 and IV- are first approximations of the percentage
 
costs of PERT/Time and PERT/Cost with contract price as the independent
 
variable. A comparison of these first approximation estimates with the
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opinions of the cost of PERT given in table IV-3 illustrates that
 
PERT is perhaps not as costly as it is thought to be. Such a com­
parison is shown in table IV-.
 
Table IV-4
 
PERCENTAGE COST OF PERT--INDUSTRY OPINIONS
 
VERSUS FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY
 
PERT/Time PERT/Cost
 
Contract Industry b Industry i
 
e
price opinionsa Findings opinionsa Findings
 
<$100,000 3.3% N.A. 6.1% N.A.
 
$100,000-$2 million 2.3 N.A. 4.6 N.Ao
 
$2-$SO million 2.0 1.0 3.8 1.6
 
$50-$100 million 1.4 0.4 3.0 0.9
 
>$100 million 1.0 <0.3 2.3 c 0.75
 
aData from table IV-3.
 
bData from fig. IV-3.
 
cData from fig. IV-4.
 
This study has not been designed to give accurate estimates for
 
contract prices below $5 million, hence estimates of the cost of PERT
 
for such contracts should not be read from figures IV-3 and IV-4. On
 
the other hand, it is evident by glancing at table IV- that the aero­
space industry has overestimated the cost of PERT.11
 
The cost of PERT should decline with time. It may be reasonable
 
liThe possible reasons underlying such overestimates are dis­
cussed in detail in Hayya, p. cit., pp. 83-112.
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to assume that most firms were in the higher regions of the learning
 
curve vis-a-vis PERT when this survey was undertaken in the fall of
 
1964. For example, the cost computed in this study of using PERT/Cost
 
for the Comsat program at Philco was 1.86 percent. This cost has
 
been verified for the fall of 1964.12 According to H. Silver, of the
 
Aerospace Corporation (which monitors Comsat): "This cost has now been
 
reduced to 0.5 percent as a result of experience gained to date; this 0.5
 
percent connotes a net saving in the cost of planning and control of
 
1 3
 
the Comsat program at Philco.,'

The experience of all firms in the Aerospace industry with PERT
 
may not be as fortunate as Philco's. Nevertheless, PERT (particularly
 
PERT/Cost) is a new method whose cost should decline with time and
 
use.
 
Cost-Effectiveness of PERT
 
This study has not attempted to establish that the use of PERT
 
in the projects reported by the questionnaire is justified through
 
cost or time savings. These savings, if any, cannot be calculated
 
because the schedule and cost experiences of each research and
 
development program are unique. On the other hand, the government,
 
as the customer, may be in a good position to judge whether PERT is
 
effective in terms of the costs incurred in its use.
 
An inquiry as to the worth of PERT related to its cost was
 
12 prom conversations with Mr. H. Silver, Aerospace Corporation,
 
February 1965.
 
13Ibid.
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directed by this author to the Department of Defense. Mr. James W.
 
Roach replied:
 
Your question about the cost-effectiveness of
 
PERT is 	a difficult one to answer and inevit­
ably involves a judgment factor. We believe,
 
as is evidenced by inclusion of a requirement
 
for PERT/Cost in Directive 3200.9, that PERT is
 
worth its cost when used for large projects in
 
the Engineering and Operational Systems Develop­
ment categories. There is some statistical
 
evidence that PERT/Cost hps reduced cost over­
runs and contract growth.14
 
The statistical evidence Mr. Roach refers to is based on a
 
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships, study, in which contracts
 
using PERT/Cost are compared, in terms of cost overruns and contract
 
growth,15 to contracts employing other techniques. The Bureau of
 
Ships' study is concerned with cost overruns only; it does not deal
 
with schedule slippages. Results of the study are given in table IV-5.
 
Table IV-5
 
BUREAU OF SHIPS' STUDY: COST OVER-

RUNS AND CONTRACT GROWTH
 
Cost Approved Contract
 
overruns increase growth
 
% % - % 
19 Contracts using PERT/Cost 7.1 4.2 11.3
 
48 Contracts not using PERT/Cost 23.4 49.1 72.5
 
Source: 	Department of the Navy. Bureau of Ships. Memorandum Ser.
 
606A-315, October 22, 1964.
 
14Letter to this author from Mr. James W. Roach, Assistant
 
Director (Engineering Management), Office of the Director of Defense
 
Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, April 30, 1965.
 
15 Contract growth is defined as the approved increase in a
 
contract plus cost overruns.
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Commenting on the above table, Mr. Roach stated that although it
 
is difficult to isolate the influence of PERT/Cost, some evidence is
 
provided of its value. Table IV-5 shows cost overruns of 7.1 percent
 
for contracts using PERT/Cost as compared to cost overruns of 23.L4
 
percent for contracts not using PERT/Cost. Furthermore, the detailed
 
planning and control PERT affords inhibits the expansion of contracts
 
beyond their initial objectives. Table IV-5, for example, shows
 
approved increases of 4.2 percent for contracts using PERT/Cost as
 
compared to similar increases of 49.1 percent for contracts not using
 
PERT/Cost. Contract growth, the stn of the cost overruns plus approved
 
increases, is, according to table IV-S, 11.3 percent for the contracts
 
using PERT/Cost as against 72.5 percent for those contracts not using
 
PERT/Cost.
 
The Bureau of Ships' study shows, also, that reductions in
 
overruns in ten out of the nineteen contracts using PERT/Cost (see
 
table IV-S) represent a potential saving of approximately $37 million.1 6
 
This $37 million, in turn, represents a saving of approximately 19
 
percent of contract prices. If such savings are inherent in every
 
contract using PERT, it is easy to see by reference to figures IV-3 and
 
IV-4 that PERT is worth the cost.
 
What are Reasonable Threshold Contract Prices?
 
It is evident that if the main criterion for the use of PERT is
 
its cost, then PERT should be applied on a contract basis (one firm)
 
rather than a project basis (several firms). This avoids the absurd
 
16The Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships, Memorandum Ser.
 
606A-243, August 21, 1964.
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situation where PERT is required in each of a large number of small
 
contracts that comprise one big project.
 
For the time being, it appears that PERT should not be utilized
 
in small contracts regardless of the size of the parent project. The
 
contracts where PERT is used should be of such magnitude that the cost
 
of the PERT operation has minimum impact upon total expenditures. The
 
index of such an impact on total expenditures is the percentage cost.
 
The threshold contract prices must be chosen so that the percentage
 
cost is at, or near, the minimum (or below a datum chosen by a decision­
maker such as DOD). These threshold contract prices differ for PERT/Time
 
and PERT/Cost, because the latter utilizes more resources than the
 
former.
 
The research findings show that the threshold contract prices
 
17
 
of DOD Directive 3200.9 are reasonable; they show also that lower
 
threshold contract prices may be used.
 
PERT/Time and Contract Price. Figure IV-3 shows that the percentage
 
cost curve of PERT/Time is almost vertical (and asymptotic to the
 
y-axis) at small contract prices, and that it begins to bend at
 
approximately a cost of 2 percent and at a contract price of $10 million.
 
The curve finally becomes almost horizontal (and asymptotic to the
 
X-axis) at a cost of 0.25 percent and at a contract price of $150
 
million, Thus, it may be advisable for a procurement officer to apply
 
PERT/Time to all R&D contracts over $10 million if he decides to use
 
1 7DOD Directive 3200.9 mentions PERT/Cost only. This study
 
deals with both PERT/Time and PERT/Cost.
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PERT/Time for planning and control.
 
PERT/Cost and Contract Price. Figure IV-W reveals that the percentage
 
cost curve of PERT/Cost is almost vertical (and asymptotic to the
 
y-axis) at small contract prices and that it begins to bend at
 
approximately a cost of 2 percent and a contract price of $15 million.
 
The curve finally becomes almost horizontal (and asymptotic to the
 
X-axis) at a cost of 0.6 percent and a contract price of $200 million.
 
A procurement officer wishing to use PERT/Cost for planning and control
 
could easily do so in contracts that exceed $15 million.
 
CHAPTER V
 
PERT/COST AND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL
 
The selection of an appropriate level of detail has been a source
 
of considerable friction between the government and the aerospace
 
industry. The DOD and NASA Guide refers to the development of a
 
work-breakdown structure where the end-item subdivisions are manage­
able units for planning and control purposes. The end-item sub­
divisions appearing at the last level in the work-breakdown structure
 
are divided into major work packages, such as engineering or manu­
facturing. The level of desirable detail, according to the Guide,
 
depends on several considerations: the size and complexity of the project,
 
the structure of the organization, and the judgment of the manager.
 
The Guide states that "normally, the lowest level work package
 
will represent a value of no more than $100,000 in cost and no more than
 
three months in elapsed time.,,2 It does not indicate, however, why a
 
$100,000 - three-month guideline is appropriate or applicable to every
 
situation. Such a basis is no doubt chosen to facilitate cost control
 
by the government. Nevertheless, the choice of an appropriate level
 
of detail may depend more on internal considerations--for example,
 
the calibre of management, the economic characteristics of the firm, or
 
the relative criticalness of a given work package--than on external
 
considerations--such as the government's desire to apply a standard
 
level of cost control in contracts where PERT is being used.
 
1DOD and NASA Guide: PERT/Cost Systems Design, Office of the
 
Secretary of Defense-National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 
(Washington, D. C., June 1962).
 
21bid., p. 29.
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Some procurement officers insist on the $100,000-three month
 
work package, even though the aerospace industry does not consider
 
this as an appropriate level of detail. One major difficulty has
 
been isolated, however, by the DOD PERT Coordinating Group. This
 
group believes that industry in general has not had enough experience
 
with PERT/Cost as an internal management tool to enable project managers
 
to select an appropriate level of detail.3
 
Analysis of the Questionnaire
 
To develop a reasonable measure for the size of the work package,
 
the groups sampled were asked to evaluate a list of probable criteria.
 
Table V-I shows the relative weight assigned to these criteria by the
 
respondents to the questionnaire.
 
The table summarizes the answers to question 12, Part A: "In
 
your judgment, what should the criteria be for the size of the PERT
 
work package?,
 
The major criterion chosen for the size of the work package was
 
that it should have a definable work content. In other words, the
 
logical sequence of events is the criterion to consider first when
 
deciding upon the size of the PERT work package. Although, as was
 
mentioned earlier, the government advocates a $100,000-three month
 
guideline for the size of the work package, table V-I shows that
 
neither dollar size nor time span is the primary consideration in the
 
3Common Problems Associated with Implementation and Operation of
 
the PERT/Cost System, PERT Coordinating Group (Washington, D. C.:
 
Special Projects Office, Bureau of Ships, Department of the Navy, 1964),
 
pp. 23-25.
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opinion of the respondents. Time span, however, received more con­
sideration than the dollar size of the package. A work package with
 
too long a time span may delay the completion, or the evaluation, of
 
an entire program; on the other hand, the establishment of an appro­
priate dollar size of the package is only necessary for cost control
 
purposes. In essence, responses to the questionnaire indicate that
 
given a choice, schedule control is a more important criterion for the
 
size of the work package than is cost control. This is consistent with
 
interview findings.
 
A tally of the opinions of the respondents regarding the $100,000­
three month guideline as the sole criterion for the size of the PERT
 
work package is presented in table V-2. It is a summary of replies to
 
question 13, Part A, of the questionnaire: "Is the $100,000-three
 
month work-package guideline meaningful?" Table V-2 shows that the
 
government group is divided on this issue. On the other hand, most of
 
the industry group does not consider the $100,000-three month guideline
 
meaningful.
 
Those in the government group supporting the $100,000-three month
 
guideline stated that it helped in controlling costs and schedules.
 
According to one systems project officer: "The guideline, when followed,
 
keeps money and time at levels which most people can comprehend.
 
Management can also do something about the problem areas before it is
 
too late and too much money has been spent."
 
Government people who did not approve the guideline cited the
 
weakness that it disregarded logical work-package units in a program.
 
One government respondent said, for example: "We want identifiable
 
-63-

Table V-1
 
RELATIVE WEIGHT GIVEN TO CRITERIA FOR THE
 
SIZE OF 
Criteriona 

Phase of the program 

Number of events 

Criticalness of events 

Cost uncertainty involved 

Technical uncertainty
 
involved 

Schedule uncertainty
 
involved 

Dollar size of package 

Time span 

Cost control 

Definable work content
 
(logical structure of
 
events) 

Other:b
 
One individual responsible
 
for the work package 

Management skill 

THE WORK PACKAGE
 
Groups Sampled
 
Government 

group 

0.70 

O.54 

0.88 

0.80 

0.66 

0.76 

0.66 

0.84 
0.88 

1.00 

x 

x 

Industry Group 
Directors 
Top 
managers 
of PERT 
programs 
PERT 
staff 
0.69 0.72 0.7[ 
0.54 0.44 0.50 
0.98 0.69 0.95 
0.85 0.86 0.9c 
0.88 0.75 0.73 
0.87 0.80 0.8c 
0.63 0.75 0.6E 
0.65 0.89 0.9/ 
0.87 0.87 1.0( 
1.00 1.00 1.0( 
x x x 
x x x 
acriteria are listed in the order shown in the questionnaire.
 
bThese criteria were volunteered by only some respondents. In order to
 
avoid improper comparisons, they have not been weighted.
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entities that are meaningful." That is, a work-package must have
 
logical beginning and ending events.
 
A majority of the industry group advanced similar arguments in
 
opposing the guideline. Many such respondents stressed that the work
 
package must be manageable, and one top manager wrote that "manage­
ability of an activity is a more important criterion than an arbitrary
 
Table V-2
 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS ABOUT THE $100,000-THREE MONTH PERT
 
WORK-PACKAGE DOD GUIDELINE
 
(answers in percent of those sampled)
 
Response 
Not No 
Type of Group Meaningful meaningful opinion 
Government 42% 42% 16% 
Industry 
Top managers 21 63 16 
Directors of 
PERT programs 29 68 3 
PERT staff 33 53 14 
choice of cost and schedule levels of control." A middle manager
 
shed more light on the problem of "manageability" by saying: "Other
 
factors such as type of contract, previous history, customer attitude,
 
customer reactions, and changes in the program may override the guide­
line. Manipulation of funds, tradeoffs, and other such factors can
 
void the guideline. The $100,000 or the three-month limit is valid
 
in the classroom--in actual practice it is not used." One may conclude
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from the above that most of the questionnaire respondents viewed the
 
$100,000-three month work-package guideline as an artificial device,
 
one that does not deal with the real situation.
 
Research Findings
 
In addition to the size of the work package, the government and
 
the aerospace industry tend to use the number of end-item levels on
 
the work-breakdown structure as another index of the PERT level of
 
detail. The number of end-item levels on the work-breakdown structure,
 
however, generally reflects the vertical stratification of an organiza­
tion. That is, an organization with a large number of organizational
 
layers is able to take the work-breakdown structure to a correspondingly
 
large number of end-item levels. Normally, organizations possess
 
relatively fixed number of authority layers, which may explain why a
 
majority of the questionnaire respondents state that the number of
 
end-item levels of the work-breakdown ,tructure is between four to six
 
for the projects reported.
 
The questionnaire data and the interviews showed that the number of
 
end-item levels in a work-breakdown structure did not change radically
 
as the organization, the size of the contract, or the type of project
 
was altered. The questionnaire data suggested, however, that the size
 
of the work package (in dollars) was primarily affected by contract
 
price. The interviews validated this finding. During one interview,
 
for example, a manager at an aerospace firm told the author that the use
 
of PERT by his firm in a prospective $1 billion contract might result
 
in work packages in the magnitude of $250,000 to $500,000. The reason
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given was that the organizational controls of the firm were tied to
 
its basic departmentation, and each department controlled work
 
packages in its own area of responsibility according to certain pro­
cedures. The nature of these controls, and the depth of detail to
 
which the controls were extended, did not differ from one work package
 
to another in spite of the fact that work packages might differ in
 
magnitude.
 
Large contracts, while involving large work packages, entail
 
higher absolute costs of planning and control than do small contracts.
 
This explains the phenomenon that the larger the work package, the
 
greater the expense of using PERT/Cost. This is illustrated in
 
figure V-1 which shows a best fit of
 
Y = 0.36361 - 0.00172 X + 0.00003 X2 (V-l)
 
where
 
Y = total operating cost of PERT/Cost, in millions of dollars, and
 
X = mean size of the work package, in thousands of dollars.
 
A relationship that describes the dependence of the size of the
 
work package upon contract price is given by
 
Y = 83.57 + 0.60 X (V-2)
 
where
 
Y = the size of the work package, in thousands of dollars, and
 
X = the contract price, in millions of dollars.
 
The linear correlation coefficient of the variables in equation
 
V-2 is 0.63. The standard error of the estimate is 109.11.
 
According to the analysis, then, the PERT/Cost detail in terms
 
of the number of end-item levels for the work-breakdown structure
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does not vary a great deal. Also the size of the work package, in
 
dollars, is dependent mainly on the size of the contract. This latter
 
fact is illustrated in equation V-2 above. It is also demonstrated in
 
table V-3 which is a summary of a stepwise regression 4 of a number of
 
relevant variables, such as contract price, number of end-item levels,
 
duration of the work package, type of organization, and class of R&D.
 
Table V-3
 
COST OF THE WORK PACKAGE: STEPWISE REGRESSION SUMMARY
 
Step Variable 
Multiple 
correlation F value 
No. entered coefficient to 
R R2 gR
2 entera 
1 Contract price 0.6292 0.3959 0.3459 20.97 
2 Number of end-item 
levels 0.73q2 0.5390 0.1432 9.63 
3 Duration of the work 
package 0.7650 0.5852 0.0461 3.33 
4 Functional organization 0.7846 0.6156 0.0305 2.30 
S R&D class II 0.8037 0.6460 0.0303 2.40 
6 Contract life 0.8101 0.6563 0.0103 0.81 
7 PERT/Cost as the only 
control system 0.8131 0.6612 0.0049 0.38 
8 Contractual requirement 0.8149 0.6640 0.0028 0.21 
9 Cost-reimbursement 
contracts 0.8151 0.6644 0.0004 0.03 
a	The 'IFvalue to enter" is the square of the ratio of the variable's
 
regression coefficient to its standard error.
 
Source: A stepwise regression computer program of the PERT/Cost data.
 
4See W. J. Dixon, ed., BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs (Los
 
Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles, 1964), pp. 233-257,
 
for an explanation of the stepwise regression.
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A multiple linear regression for the cost of the work package as
 
a function of contract price, number of end-item levels, duration of
 
the work package, type of organization, and R&D class yields
 
Y = -234.48 + 0.65 X1 + .61 X2 + 55.19 X3 
(0.12) (2.83) (35.64)
 
+ 77.08 X4 + 43.92 X5 (V-3) 
(43.88) (12.86)
 
where the values within the parentheses are the standard errors of
 
the regression coefficients, and where
 
Y = the cost of the work package, in thousands of dollars,
 
XI= contract price, in millions of dollars,
 
X2= duration of the work package, in months,
 
X3= R&D class (class I made of PDP, research, exploratory develop­
ment, or advanced developments = 0; class II made of engineer­
ing developments, management and support, or operational system
 
development = 1)
 
X\I= type of organization (functional = 1; product or project = 
0), and 
X5= number of end-item levels in the work-breakdown structure. 
Some of the variables, such as the size of the contract and the
 
type of organization, which affect the PERT/Cost level of detail are
 
considered in the DOD and NASA Guide. As stated previously, the Guide
 
recommends that the level of detail should depend on three qualitative
 
considerations and one quantitative factor. The qualitative con­
siderations are: the size and the complexity of the project, the
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structure of the organization, and the judgment of the manager.5
 
The quantitative consideration is that the lowest level work-package
 
be no more than $100,000 in cost and no more than three months in
 
elapsed time.6
 
The interviews conducted by the author revealed the latter
 
guideline as sometimes the sole basis for determining the level of
 
detail where PERT was used. This represented a rigid adherence to
 
the Guide, and a lack of concern for the realities of the particular
 
project and the needs of the individual firm.
 
Because the $100,000-three month guideline, taken alone, disregards
 
individual considerations of aerospace firms, it has not met with
 
support. The questionnaire survey, for example, shows that of ninety­
seven respondents, only twenty-one considered this guideline meaningful,
 
and even then there were reservations related to motives more vital
 
to the firm (see table V-2).
 
The motivation for the $100,000-three month guideline lies,
 
undoubtedly, in the unhappy history of the cost overruns and schedule
 
slippages characteristic of defense and aerospace weapon systems. 
 The
 
author has been unable to discover in the literature a theoretical
 
basis for this guideline, but the literature and the questionnaire
 
data do suggest refutations for the guideline.
 
Time and cost are interchangeable resources, with trade-offs
 
between the two dependent on the economic characteristics of the
 
5DOD and NASA Guide 
- PERT Cost, p. 29.
 
61hid. 
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individual firm. The time-cost relationship for the production of a
 
particular work package in a given firm may be described by the equal
 
product curve shown in figure V-2. The points on the curve represent
 
the different combinations of time and cost that can be used to pro­
duce the same work package.
 
In a study of the time-cost relationship, Charles E. Clark has
 
postulated a hyperbolic time-cost function (like that in figure V-2)
 
to show the possible time and cost relations for an event in a net­
work of activities.7 Clark has shown that, given a hyperbolic cost
 
function, there is a unique slackless schedule.8 This schedule
 
determines a specific time duration for each activity in the network.
 
Therefore, the time geometry of the total project fixes the time span
 
of a work package,9 The time required for the completion of each work
 
package also determines the cost, as shown in figure V-2. This pair
 
Equal product curve
 
Cost
 iiIl
 
Time
 
7Charles E. Clark, "The Optimum Allocation of Resources~among the
 
Activities of a Network," Journal of Industrial Engineering (February,
 
1961), pp. 11-17.
 
8The term "1slack" or "float," is the difference between the latest
 
allowable date and the expected date for the completion of an activity.
 
9A work package is assumed to consist of one or more logically
 
connected activities.
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(time, cost) determines an optimum situation in terms of time and
 
cost, because the choice of each is based on a slackless schedule.
 
The slackless schedule means that no activity has been planned in
 
shorter time, and therefore at higher cost, than was necessary to
 
meet the completion date of the project. 
That schedule is, therefore,
 
the lowest cost plan for a project.10
 
In theory, then, the slackless schedule of a project determines
 
the time span of each activity. The time, in turn, determines the
 
cost of that activity. One, or a number, of connected activities (or
 
subpackages) that may be managed by one man should become a work
 
package without any arbitrary constraints of time and cost, because
 
these are determined by the slackless schedule. 
 The slackless sched­
ule is naturally a function of the project itself, the resources of
 
the firm, and the calibre of management.
 
The main weakness of the $100,000-three month guideline is that
 
it assumes a unique set of conditions for all firms. This connotes
 
a standard project, a standard work package, and the economic constraints
 
whereby all firms have an identical equal product curve. Observations
 
in the aerospace industry do not support these assumptions.
 
The data on the cost and time of mean work packages, gathered in
 
replies to questions 21 to 23, Part B of the questionnaire, do not
 
suggest one equal product curve for the firms reporting. A scatter
 
diagram of these data are shown in figure V-3, with the cross-hatched
 
area indicating the set conforming to the $100,000-three month guideline.
 
10Henry B. Eyring, Evaluation of Planning Models for Research and
Development Projects. (DBA dissertation, Graduate School of Business,
 
Harvard University, 1963), p. 31.
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Figure V-3 shows that the scatter of the points does not lend itself
 
to one equal cost-time product curve for the data reported. Further­
more, figure V-3 shows that only four out of thirty-four firms report­
edly using PERT/Cost adhered to the $100,000-three month guideline;
 
these four firms fall in the cross-hatched portion of figure V-3.
 
As mentioned earlier, a $100,000-three month work-package guide­
line is justified only if all aerospace firms possess an identical equal
 
product cost-time function. (Such an improbable situation is presented
 
in the isoquant of figure V-4.) In addition, the guideline must assume
 
that all aerospace firms possess a unique budget - schedule constraint
 
(see figure V-4) that is always tangent to the equal product curve at
 
$100,000-three months.
 
The author argues that aerospace firms possess unique equal
 
product cost-time functions. Moreover, each project has a unique
 
slackless schedule. The interaction of the project with the firm,
 
therefore, determines the optimum mode of operation, including the
 
size of the work package. To specify an arbitrary guideline for all
 
firms obviously is illogical.
 
Although a mathematical model for the size of the work package
 
has been derived from the questionnaire data (see equations V-2 and
 
V-3), the author is not suggesting that qualitative criteria for the
 
size of the work package are not of paramount importance. For any
 
particular firm, these qualitative criteria can be the result of
 
experience and good judgment. Of these qualitative criteria, the
 
most important is how a work package fits into the overall schedule
 
of the project; that schedule should determine the time duration and,
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hence, the cost of network activities. Several of these activities
 
may be combined together under the direction of one man, but the work
 
package must be of reasonable magnitude--it must not be managed by
 
more than one man. A logical structure of events and a definable
 
work content should be the underlying features of any work package.
 
CHAPTER VI
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
In analyzing the government's position on :the use of PERT in
 
procurement, it appears that it made some arbitrary decisions. Further­
more, in many instances, DOD Directive 3200.9,1 The DOD and NASA Guide,
2
 
and various government memoranda were imprecise about when, where, and
 
under what circumstances PERT should be used.
 
The vague and arbitrary nature of the government criteria provoked
 
great controversy within the aerospace industry and between the
 
aerospace industry and the government. The industry feared that PERT
 
would be applied to all types of contracts, fixed-price as well as
 
cost-reimbursement, and that it would be applied indiscriminately to
 
production as well as to R&D projects. Many individuals in the aero­
space industry were alarmed also that the level of detail suggested by
 
The DOD and NASA Guide would contribute more to a proliferation of
 
reports than to effective management and control of weapons' and
 
aerospace systems. In addition, the seemingly arbitrary nature of the
 
threshold contract prices of DOD Directive 3200.9 provoked questions
 
about the value of such ceiteria.
 
The situation, however, was not an altogether surprising one.
 
The government was trying to correct the excesses of the past and to
 
solve the problems of schedule slippages and cost overruns. It turned
 
to PERT as the most sophisticated tool available for the purpose at
 
IDOD Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,
 
February 26, 1964, and July 1, 1965.
 
2 DOD and NASA Guide: PERT/Cost Systems Design (Washington, D. C.:
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense-National Aeronautics and Space
 
Administration, June 1962).
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hand; it could only hope to find its way by trial and error. PERT
 
had never been used for the management of a large system involving many
 
contracts. The nature of the criteria, and the ensuing complication
 
of interpretation, reflected the difficulties involved in such an
 
undertaking. The greater portion of these difficulties was shouldered
 
by procurement and systems project officers, who were generally divorced
 
from the DOD policy makers.
 
This study is designed to assist procurement and systems project
 
officers in overcoming some of thes'e'diffieulties and in seeking solu­
tions to the problems associated with the use of PERT as a method of
 
planning and controlling defense and aerospace weapons' systems. The
 
principles suggested for the use of PERT in procurement contracts were
 
developed on the basis of the insights and findings of an extensive
 
research effort.
 
The research was designed in three steps, generally sequential.
 
First, a review was made of the literature. This included material
 
that described the general environment of PERT in the aerospace industry.
 
It also included government directives, memoranda, and various articles
 
that presented the government case for applying new controls (in the
 
form of PERT) to the procurement process.
 
The literature, however, did not provide a complete nor accurate
 
description of the positions of the aerospace industry and of systems
 
project officers on the use of PERT to plan and control procurement
 
contracts. Thus, the second step of the research was comprised of a
 
series of depth interviews with aerospace industry and government
 
personnel. Industry interviews were conducted with selected top managers,
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directors of PERT, and members of PERT staffs. The government group
 
consisted of procurement and systems project officers. Apart from
 
determining the problems associated with the use of PERT, the inter­
views furnished the basic framework for the third step of the research.
 
In this latter step a comprehensive questionnaire survey was
 
conducted among aerospace firms and systems project offices using PERT.
 
The survey was, in effect, a non-probability sample with three
 
purposes: (1) to solicit opinions on the use of PERT as it related to
 
contract type, project type, threshold contract prices, and level of
 
detail; (2)to secure numerical data for the development of models for
 
the cost of PERT and for the size of the PERT/Cost work package; and
 
(3) to verify the validity of attitudes of skepticism toward PERT
 
expressed during the interviews--if prevalent, such attitudes could
 
easily impede efforts to implement PERT.
 
The analysis of the questionnaire results suggests that the
 
attitude of the aerospace industry toward PERT is not as negative or
 
as skeptical as it was thought to be during much of the interviews.
 
Apparently the aerospace industry approves PERT as a planning and control
 
tool. The analysis also suggests that the aerospace industry does not
 
object to the government requiring PERT in procurement contracts so
 
long as the gov6rnment is selective about where and when this is done.
 
According to the questionnaire respondents, PERT should be confined
 
to research and development and military construction projects. The
 
use of PERT in basic research or repetitive production activities appears
 
to be unnecessary because basic research cannot be controlled closely,
 
at least meaningfully, and because production activities are being
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mastered by simpler methods, such as the line of balance (LOB) and
 
Gantt charts. The need for PERT, therefore, exists only in R&D pro­
jects and in military construction programs.
 
Analysis of the questionnaire replies and the force of logic
 
indicate that the government should require a contractor to use PERT
 
in cost-reimbursement contracts only, provided that the project is in
 
R&D and that it is of sufficient magnitude to warrant the cost of using
 
PERT. There is a sharp division, however, between the industry and
 
government groups surveyed on the issue of requiring the use of PERT in
 
fixed-price contracts. The government group argues that the government
 
PERT contractual requirement should include all fixed-priee contracts,
 
with the possible exception of firm fixed-price contracts. The
 
industry group, on the other hand, objects to the intrusion of govern­
ment control in all fixed-price contracts, because the major burden
 
of the profit and loss risk is carried by the contractor himself. The
 
evidence supports the view of the aerospace industry.
 
The numerical data provided by the questionnaires made possible
 
the development of approximations for the cost of PERT. A first
 
approximation for the cost of PERT/Time was found to be
 
X(y - 0.1s6) = 20.6 (VI-l) 
where
 
X = contract price in millions of dollars, and
 
y = the cost of PERT/Time as a percentage of contract price.
 
A first approximation of the cost of PERT/Cost was found to be
 
X(y - 0.447) = 29.3 (VI-2) 
where
 
X = contract price in millions of dollars, and
 
y = the cost of PERT/CU L db a jPL'u iLage of contract price. 
Equations VI-l and VI-2 are hyperbolic functions similar to 
those of the average fixed-cost functions in classical economics. 
These hyperbolic functions show a high percentage cost for using PERT
 
in small contracts and a low, and almost constant, percentage cost
 
for using PERT in large contracts. These functions suggest that if
 
PERT is to be used, it should be in instances where the percentage cost
 
is at or below 2 percent. This indicates threshold contract prices of
 
$10 million for PERT/Time and $15 million for PERT/Cost.
 
The analysis of the questionnaire also suggests that the number
 
of end-item levels in the work-breakdown structure does not vary a
 
great deal. Usually a firm using PERT/Cost takes the work-breakdown
 
structure to about 4 to 6 levels. The size of the work package,
 
however, varies a good deal, depending on the magnitude of the project-­
the bigger the project, the bigger the work package. A relationship
 
of the size of the work package and contract price derived from the
 
questionnaire data is given by
 
Y = 83.57 + 0.60 X (VI-3)
 
where
 
Y = the size of the work package in thousands of dollars, and
 
X = the contract price, in millions of dollars.
 
The questionnaire data failed to yield a meaningful model for
 
the duration of the work package. It depends, however, on the quali­
tative criterion of how the package fits in the overall program sched­
ule. The analysis suggests that the work package, in terms of cost
 
and time, must be of manageable size, that it must be structured
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logically, and that it must be managed by one man.
 
On the basis of the above conclusions, the author recommends
 
four principles to be used by procurement and systems project officers
 
in making decisions about requiring PERT in procurement contracts.
 
These principles relate to the use of PERT in certain types of con­
tracts and projects. They also relate to constraints of minimum con­
tract price and to the level of detail desirable for planning and control.
 
These principles are:
 
1. 	Type of contract. Systems project officers should require
 
PERT in cost-reimbursement contracts only.
 
2. 	Type of project. Systems project officers should require
 
PERT in research and development (R&D) and in military
 
construction programs only.
 
3. 	Threshold contract prices. The threshold contract price
 
that makes the use of PERT/Time mandatory should be $10
 
million; that for PERT/Cost should be $15 million. These
 
threshold prices are subject to constraints relating to
 
type of contract and project.
 
4. 	PERT/Cost level of detail. The work content of the lowest
 
level work package in the PERT/Cost work-breakdown structure
 
must be well defined and the package itself must be of such
 
size that it can be managed by one man or one department.
 
Furthermore, the duration of the work package must be sub­
ordinated to the overall plan or schedule.
 
From principles 1, 2, and 3 suggested above, it is possible to
 
devise a simple decision model for the use of PERT by procurement and
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systems project officers. This model is illustrated schematically
 
in figure VI-I.
 
By use of the model a procurement officer may easily determine
 
when, and under what circumstances, he may apply PERT/Time or PERT/Cost.
 
The model of figure VI-i, however, does not take into account the
 
criticalness of a particular project in the defense and aerospace
 
effort. Procurement officers may wish to control such projects closely.
 
They should, therefore, use PERT/Time or PERT/Cost regardless of the
 
constraints shown in Figure VI-i.
 
YES
 
F RUSE OTHERYES PLANNING AND 
CONTROL
 
TECHNQUES 
YES
 PERT/OS 
YES NO
 
USE USE
 
PERT/TIME PERT/COST 
FIGURE VI- I 
A DECISION MODEL FOR THE USE OF PERT 
IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS 
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Advanced developments. Advanced developments include all
 
projects that have moved into the production of hardware for
 
experimental or operational test. They are characterized by line
 
item projects, and program control is exercised on a project basis.
 
A further characteristic lies in the design of items being directed
 
toward hardware for test or experimentation as opposed to items
 
designed and engineered for eventual service use. Examples are VTOL
 
aircraft, ARTE-MIS, experimental hydrofoil, X-15 and aerospace plane
 
components.
 
Aerospace industry. The aerospace industry is the segment of
 
trade that is primarily engaged in the production of aircraft, guided
 
missiles, and all other air and space vehicles.
 
Control. 
Control is a process that involves the measurement and
 
correction of performance in order to insure that objectives and
 
plans are accomplished.
 
Critical path. The critical path is the longest path through
 
a network.
 
Delivery schedule. A statement, often tabular, of delivery of
 
quantities of procured items, by dates that were, or are, to be
 
delivered.
 
End item. An end item is the lowest level component in a work
 
breakdown structure.
 
Engineering developments. Engineering developments include those
 
development programs being engineered for service use that have not
 
yet been approved for procurement or operation. For example: MAULER,
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TYPHON, B-70. This area is characterized by major line item projects
 
and program control will be exercised by review of individual projects.
 
Exploratory development. Exploratory development includes all
 
effort directed toward the solution of specific military problems,
 
short of major development projects. This type of effort may vary
 
from fairly fundamental applied research to quite sophisticated bread­
board hardware, study, programming and planning efforts. It would
 
thus include studies, investigations and minor development effort.
 
The dominant characteristic of this category of effort is that it is
 
pointed toward specific military problem areas with a view toward
 
developing and evaluating the feasibility and practicability of
 
proposed solutions and determining their parameters. Program control
 
of the exploratory development element will normally be exercised by
 
general level of effort.
 
Government. For this study, the term government includes:
 
1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
 
2. Department of the Army
 
3. Department of the Navy
 
4. Department of the Air Force
 
5. Atomic Energy Commission
 
6. Bureau of the Budget
 
7. Federal Aviation Agency
 
8. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
 
Interface. An interface is an event that signals the necessary
 
transfer of responsibility, end items, or information from one detailed
 
network to another. Examples of interface events are the receipt
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of an item, such as hardware, or the release of engineering drawings
 
to manufacturing.
 
Line of balance. Line of balance (LOB) is a technique for
 
assembling, selecting, interpreting and presenting in graphic form
 
the essential factors involved in a production process, from raw
 
materials to completion of the end product, against a background of
 
time. It is a management tool that utilizes the exception principle
 
to show only the most important facts.
 
Management and support. Management and support include effort
 
directed toward support of installations or operations required for
 
general research and development use. Included would be test ranges,
 
military construction, maintenance support of laboratories, operations
 
and maintenance of test aircraft and ships. Costs of laboratory
 
personnel, either in-house or contract-operated, will be assigned to
 
appropriate projects or as a line item in the research, exploratory
 
development, or advanced development program areas, as appropriate.
 
Military construction costs directly related to a major development
 
program will be included in the appropriate element.
 
Milestone. A milestone is a significant event within a project.
 
Network. A network is a diagram showing the interrelations and
 
interfaces of activities and events required to accomplish a specified
 
objective.
 
Operational system development. Operational system development
 
includes effort directed toward development, engineering and test of
 
systems, support programs, vehicles and weapons that have been approved
 
for production and service employment. This area is included for
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convenience in considering all RTD&E projects. All items in this
 
area are major line item projects which appear as RTD&E costs of
 
weapons systems elements in other programs. Program control thus
 
will be exercised by review of the individual research and development
 
effort in each weapon system element.
 
Overhead. Overhead is expense which is not directly identified
 
with a productive cost center or operating activity.-

Overrun. An overrun is the difference between the estimated
 
cost of a work performed and the actual cost.
 
PERT. PERT (or PERT/Cost) is a method of providing systematic
 
cost analysis information (via regular reports) correlated to time.
 
The objectives of PERT are:
 
1. Definition of the work to be performed.
 
2. Development of realistic schedule and cost estimates based
 
on the resources planned to perform the work.
 
3. Determination of resource allocation to optimize time,
 
cost, and technical performance objectives.
 
4. Identification of potential delays and cost overruns for
 
corrective action.
 
Phases in Weapons Acquisition. There are five consecutive
 
phases in weapons acquisition. These are:
 
1. The pre-request for proposal phase.
 
2. The program definition phase.
 
3. The weapon system development phase.
 
4. The weapon system production phase.
 
S. The operational phase.
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Planning. Planning is a process which involves the selection,
 
from among alternatives, of objectives, policies, procedures, and
 
programs.
 
Polaris. Submarine-launched, 2-stage, solid propellant missile.
 
Principle. A principle is a general proposition sufficiently
 
applicable to a series of phenomena under consideration to provide
 
a guide to action.
 
Project definition phase. The project definition (or contract
 
definition) phase consists of: (1)predefinition, (2) actual pro­
ject definition, and (3) weapon system development contract defini­
tion. The main feature of this phase is that definitive program
 
planning is accomplished prior to granting full-scale development
 
contracts. It has the following objectives: the preparation of
 
detailed plans, realistic cost and schedule estimates; identification
 
of high risk areas; evaluation of time-cost performance trade-offs;
 
determination of achievable system performance or design requirements
 
specifications and end item detail specifications; and the development
 
of a basis for firm fixed-price or incentive contracts for the
 
acquisition phase. The fundamental purpose of the definition phase,
 
then, is to define the cost, schedule, and technical requirements of
 
a program as early as possible in its life cycle.
 
Research. Research includes all effort directed toward increased
 
knowledge of natural phenomena and environment and toward the solution
 
of problems in the physical, behavioral and social sciences that have
 
no clear direct military application. It would by definition thus
 
include all basic research and, in addition, that applied research
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directed toward the expansion of knowledge in various scientific
 
areas. It does not include efforts directed toward proving the
 
feasibility of solutions to problems of immediate military importance
 
or time-oriented investigations and developments. The research
 
elements are further characterized by using level of effort as the
 
principal program control.
 
Slippage. Slippage is a delay, or nonaccomplishment, of an
 
event or task.
 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty is the relative unpredictability of
 
the outcome of a contemplated action.
 
Weapon system. An entity consisting of a weapon, weapons, or
 
equipment, together with all related and integrated material and
 
supporting facilities, required to bring the weapon on target or
 
cause the equipment to perform the function for which it was built.
 
Work-breakdown structure. The work-breakdown structure is a
 
family-tree subdivision of a program, beginning with the end objec­
tives and then subdividing these objectives into successively smaller
 
end-item subdivisions.
 
Work package. The work package is the unit of work required to
 
complete a specific job or process. Examples are reports, designs,
 
documents, or pieces of hardware.
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INSTRUCTIONS
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to support research which
 
will help establish basic principles to permit NASA and DOD procure­
ment officers determine the appropriate application of PERT/Cost.
 
It attempts to evoke responses from industry as well as government,
 
and to integrate those responses in an objective manner. The questionnaire
 
pertains only to defense and aerospace work, and the term PERT will be
 
used synonymously with PERT/Cost.
 
The questionnaire consists of two parts: A and B. Part A is to
 
elicit your opinions in the areas of contract type, minimum contract
 
price, level of detail, and project type. Part B pertains to general
 
information on one project only.
 
Your own estimate or your own opinion is all that is required in
 
answering both parts of this questionnaire. If you find that a partic­
ular item is not applicable to your organization, write "Not Applicable"
 
in the space reserved for the answer to that question. If you wish to
 
expand further on any question, please attach additional sheets.
 
Be assured that no information from this questionnaire will be
 
revealed. This information will be aggregated with that of other re­
spondents before conclusions are drawn.
 
In the appendix are standard definitions that are well known to
 
the practitioners in the field. These definitions may be referred to
 
in case of doubt.
 
Please fill in the questionnaire and return it at your earliest
 
convenience to:
 
Jack Hayya
 
Division of Research
 
Graduate School of Business Administration
 
University of California, Los Angeles
 
Los Angeles 24, California
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PART A 
THE 	 FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE DESIGNED FIRST TO IDENTIFY YOUR POSITION 
WITHIN YOUR ORGANIZATION, AND SECOND TO ELICIT YOUR OPINIONS IN THE
 
AREAS OF CONTRACT TYPE, MINIMUM CONTRACT PRICE, LEVEL OF DETAIL, AND
 
PROJECT TYPE.
 
1. 	Do you hold a position in a firm or a systems project office?
 
a. 	Firm
 
b. 	Systems Project Office
 
2. 	If the answer to question I is "a", what are the name and location
 
of your firm?
 
3. If the answer to question 1 is "a", how is your firm organized?
 
Please check one or more.
 
a. Functional basis d. Other (Specify) 
b. Project basis 
c. Product basis 
4. If the answer to question 1 is "a", what is your position in your
 
firm? Please check one or more.
 
a. Top manager 	 e. Multiple Project Manager
 
b. Supervisor 	 f. PERT Coordinator
 
c. 	Director of PERT Program g. Other (Specify)
 
d. 	Single Project Manager___
 
5. 	If the answer to question I is "b", what are the name and location
 
of your systems project office?
 
6. 	If the answer to question 1 is "b", what is your position?
 
a. 	Systems Project Officer d. General Accounting Officer
 
b. Procurement Officer 	 e. Other (Specify)
 
c. 	Contracting Officer
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7. In your judgment, that should be the criteria for using PERT on
 
one type of contract versus another? Please check that you feel 
are the critical elements.
 
Very Less Not 
Criteria Important Important Important Important 
Cost Uncertainty
 
Technical Uncertainty 
Number of Interfaces
 
Complexity of the Job 
Schedule Uncertainty 
Reliability Requirements 
Type of Incentives
 
Past Performance of Contractor 
Project Priority from
 
Customer Viewpoint
 
Contract Price
 
Life of Contract
 
Other (Specify)
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8. 	 In your opinion, should the type of contract (e.g., CPIF) have 
anything to do with the customer requiring PERT? 
Yes __ 	 No __ 
9. 	 If "Yes" on question 8, in which of the following contract types 
should the customer require PERT? Please check the appropriate 
boxes in the table below and give the reasons for your choice. 
No
 
Contract Type Yes No Opinion Reasons
 
Time and 
Material
 
Cost and Cost
 
Sharing
 
Cost Plus
 
Fixed Fee
 
Cost Plus
 
Incentive Fee
 
Fixed Price with
 
Escalation
 
Fixed Price with
 
Redetermination
 
Fixed Price with 
Incentive Fee
 
Firm Fixed Price 
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10. 	 What should the criteria used by the customer be before deciding 
to impose PERT? Please check the critical elements. 
Very Less Not
 
Criteria Important Important Important Important
 
Basic Research
 
P R&D ........ 
. Production 
ol 
other (Specify) 
No. of Interfaces 
No. of Subsystems 
Technical Uncertainty 
Schedule Uncertainty 
Cost 	Uncertainty
 
Dollar Size of Contract 
Past 	Performance of Contractor
 
Project Priority from
 
Customer Viewpoint
 
Other (Specify) 
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11. 	 In your judgment, what should the criteria be for the level of 
detail of a PERT vork breakdown structure? Please check the 
critical elements.
 
Very less Not 
Criteria Important Important Important Important 
Management Skill 
Size of the Firm 
Manageable Size of the Work 
Package (in dollars and time) 
Number of Interfaces
 
Contract Price
 
Technical Complexity 
Schedule Uncertainty 
Cost 	Uncertainty
 
Technical Uncertainty 
Cost Control 
Schedule Control
 
Other (Specify) 
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12. 	 In your judgment, what should be the criteria for the size of 
the PERT work package? Please check the critical elements. 
Very Less Not 
Criteria Important Important Important Important 
Phase of the Program 
Number of Events 
Criticalness of Events
 
Cost Uncertainty Involved
 
Technical Uncertainty 
Involved
 
Schedule Uncertainty 
Involved 
Dollar Size of Package 
Time 	Span
 
Cost 	Control
 
Definable Work Content 
(logical Structure of Events) 
Other (Specify) 
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13. Is the $100,O00/3-month work package guideline meaningful? 
Yes No 
14. Why? 
15. 	 In your judgment, is the $25 million for research, test, devel­
opment, and evaluation (RTD&E) or $100 million for production
 
investment (minimum program prices that make the application of
 
PERT/Cost mandatory) required by DOD Directive 3200.9 a good rule?
 
Yes 	 No
 
16. 	 Why?
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PART B 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO ONE DEFENSE 
OR AEROSPACE CONTRACT BEING HANDLED BY YOUR ORGANIZATION. 
1. What is the name of the project or application? 
2. What is the general range of the size of the contract in million
 
dollars? Please check the appropriate box.
 
a. $ OM - $ 4.99M 0 h. Above $499.99M El 
b. 
c. 
$ 5M - $ 24.99M 
$ 25M ­ $ 49.99M 
M 
Cl 
d. $ 50M ­
e. $100M ­
$ 99.99M 
$199.99M 
M 
5­
f. 
g. 
$2004 ­
$350M ­
$349.99M 
$499.99M 
Ml 
El 
3. What is the duration range for the life of the contract in months?
 
Please check the appropriate box.
 
a. 0 mo. - 5.99 mo. 5 
b. 6 mo. - 11.99 mo. C 
c. 12 o. - 23.99 mo. M 
d. 24 mo. - 39.99 mo. Ei 
e. 40 mo. - 59.99 m. M 
f. Above 59.99 to. El 
4. What is the type of the project? Please check one.
 
a. Basic Research
 
b. Research and Development
 
c. Repetitive Production
 
d. Other (Specify)
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5. If an R&D contract, what is the stage of the project at this time?
 
Please check the most relevant stage(s).
 
a. Research 
b. Exploratory Development 
c. Advanced Developments 
d. Engineering Developments 
e. Management and Support 
f. 	Operational System Development
 
6. 	What is the stage of the contract, using a more general terminology
 
shown below? Please check the most relevant stage(s).
 
a. 	Research
 
b. 	Early Development Phase
 
c. 	Fabricatiod
 
d. 	Testing­
e. 	Redesign
 
f. 	Prototype Production
 
g. 	Other (Specify)
 
7. 	Is PERT contractually required at this stage?
 
Yes 	 No
 
8. 	If "No" on question 7 above, are you PERTing this stage of the
 
contract anyway?
 
Yes 	 No
 
9. 	If "No" on question 8 above, what control systems do you use on
 
this contract? Please check one or more.
 
a. 	Line of Balance
 
b. 	Bar or Gantt Charts
 
c. 	Budgetary Controls
 
d. 	Milestone Reports
 
e. 	Input/Output Reports
 
f. 	Others (Specify)
 
-115­
10. 	What is the contract type? Please check one.
 
a. Time and Material
 
b. Cost and Cost Sharing.
 
c. Cost plus fixed fee
 
d. Cost plus incentive fee
 
e. Fixed price with escalation
 
f. Fixed price with redetermination
 
g. Fixed price with incentive fee
 
h. Firm Fixed Price
 
i. Other (Specify)
 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ONLY IF YOU ARE PERTING THE
 
CONTRACT AT THIS STAGE.
 
11. 	 Are you using PERT/Time or PERT/Cost? Please check one.
 
a. PERT/Time
 
b. PERT/Cost
 
12. 	 Do you use a computer at this stage?
 
Yes 	 No
 
13. 	 If "Yes" on question 12 above, what is the make and model of
 
the computer you use?
 
Make 	 Model
 
14. 	 If "Les" on question 12 above, please identify PERT computer
 
program being used.
 
15. 	 If "Yes" on question 12 above, what is your estimate of the
 
number of computer hrs used last month to PERT this contract?
 
hrs 
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16. 	Please fill boxes in table below as they apply to this contract. 
You own estimates are acceptable. 
PERSONNEL EMPLOYED LAST MONTH IN PERTING
 
THIS CONTRACT
 
(Please convert part time personnel 
to equivalent full time personnel) 
Type of Personnel 
PERT Analysts 
Supervisors
 
Engineers
 
Secretaries
 
(inC. clerical help)
 
Others (Specify)
 
Number 
Full Time 
17. 	 Does your PERT system substitute for your conventional pre-PERT
control system (e.g. Gantt charts) at this stage of the contract? 
Yes - No _ 
18. 	 If "No" on question 17, is PERT a major control system at this 
stage of the contract?
 
Yes No
 
19. 	 Is the cost of the PERT operation a direct or an 
in this contract? Please check one or both. 
Direct Charge 	 Indirect Charge 
20. 	 How many end item levels are there at this stage? 
indirect charge 
Please check 
one. 
Level I 
Level 2 
level 3 
level 4 -
Level 5 -
Level 6 __ More than 10 levels 
­
level 7 
level 8 
Level 9 
Level 10 
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21. 	What, in your opinion, is the size of the mean work package
 
(in dollars) at this time?
 
22. 	 What, in your opinion, is the duration of the mean work package
 
(in months) at this time? 
months
 
23. 	 What, in your opinion, is the range in size of work packages
 
at this stage in dollars and time?
 
Dollars: $ to $
 
Time: months months
 
24. 	What problems relating to PERT, if any, have you encountered
 
in the last six months?
 
;5. 	 What is your opinion of PERT as a management system?
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Appendix
 
DEFINITIONS
 
Research (DOD Category 1): includes all effort directed to­
ward increased knowledge of natural phenomena and environment and
 
efforts directed toward the solution of problems in the physical,
 
behavioral and social sciences that have no clear direct military
 
application. It would, thus, by definition, include all basic
 
research and, in addition, that applied research directed toward
 
the expansion of knowledge in various scientific areas. It does
 
not include efforts directed to prove the feasibility of solutions
 
of problems of immediate military importance or time-oriented invest­
igations and developments. The Research elements are further
 
characterized by using level of effort as the principal program
 
control.
 
Exploratory Development (DOD Category 2): includes all effort
 
directed toward the solution of specific military problems, short
 
of major development projects. This type of effort may vary from
 
fairly fundamental applied research to quite sophisticated bread­
board hardware; study, programming and planning efforts. It would
 
thus include studies, investigations and minor development effort.
 
The dominant characteristic of this category of effort is that it
 
be pointed toward specific military problem areas with a view to­
ward developing and evaluating the feasibility and practicability
 
of proposed solutions and determining their parameters. Program
 
control of the Exploratory Development element will normally be
 
exercised by general level of effort.
 
Advanced Developments (DOD Category 3): include all projects
 
which have moved into the development of hardware for experimental
 
or operational test. It is characterized by line item projects
 
and program control is exercised on a project basis. A further
 
description characteristic lies in the design of such items being
 
directed toward hardware for test or experimentation as opposed
 
to items designed and engineered for eventual Service use. Ex­
amples are VTOL Aircraft, ARTEMIS, Experimental Hydrofoil, X-15
 
and Aerospace Plane Components.
 
Engineering Developments (DOD Category 4): include those devel­
opment programs being engineered for Service use but which have
 
not yet been approved for procurement or operation. For example:
 
MAULER, TYPHON, B-70. This area is characterized by major line
 
item projects and program control will be exercised by review of
 
individual projects.
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Management and Support (DOD Category 5): include research and
 
development effort directed toward support of installations or
 
operations required for general research and development use.
 
Included would be test ranges, military construction, maintenance
 
support of laboratories, operations and maintenance of test air­
craft and ships. Costs of laboratory personnel, either in-house
 
or contract-operated, would be assigned to appropriate projects
 
or as a line item in the Research, Exploratory Development, or
 
Advanced Development Programs areas, as appropriate. Military
 
Construction costs directly related to a major development program
 
will be included in the appropriate element.
 
Operational System Development (DOD Category 6): includes
 
research and development effort directed toward development,
 
eng-ineering and test of - systems, support programs, vehicles
 
and weapons that have been approved for productionand Service
 
employment. This area is included for convenience in consider­
ing all RDT&E projects. All items in this area are major line
 
item projects which appear as RDT&E Costs of Weapons Systems
 
Elements in other Programs. Program control will thus be exer­
cised by review of the individual research and development effort
 
in each Weapon System Element.
 
Organization: the term "organization" pertains to one firm, 
or to one systems project office. 
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